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Abstract
Quantum Hoare logic allows us to reason about quantum programs. We present an extension
of quantum Hoare logic that introduces “ghost variables” to extend the expressive power
of pre-/postconditions. Ghost variables are variables that do not actually occur in the
program and are allowed to have arbitrary quantum states (in a sense, they are existentially
quantified), and be entangled with program variables. Ghost variables allow us to express
properties such as the distribution of a program variable or the fact that a variable has
classical content. And as a case study, we show how quantum Hoare logic with ghost
variables can be used to prove the security of the quantum one-time pad.
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1 Introduction
Designing algorithms is an inherently error-prone process. This is especially true for quantum
algorithms. Quantum algorithms can solve certain computational problems much faster than
classical computers (e.g., [18, 10, 11]), and most likely will be of great impact once quantum
computers are available. And already now, analyzing quantum algorithms is of practical relevance
when proving the security of cryptosystems against future quantum attackers (post-quantum
cryptography). But quantum algorithms are difficult to get right: Quantum mechanics has
many properties that go against human intuition, and quantum programs are difficult to test
and debug since we cannot directly observe their state (except in small-scale simulations). A
solution to this problem is formal verification where we prove the behavior of the algorithm. In
the classical realm, Hoare logic [12] (and its close relative, the predicate transformers [8], which
we treat as the same for the sake of this introduction) has proven to be an invaluable tool for
the analysis of imperative programs. In Hoare logics, we analyze the behavior of a program by
investigating what “postcondition” the final state of a program satisfies if the initial state satisfies
a certain “precondition”. This allows us to formally prove the behavior of a complex program by
first deriving the behavior of individual lines of code and then modularly plugging these together
to get a description of the behavior of the whole program. Hoare logics have been developed also
for probabilistic programs [14, 15] and quantum programs [7, 20, 5, 9, 13].
However, existing Hoare logics still have limitations at to what can be expressed within a pre-
/postcondition. For example, we cannot express that the value of a certain variable is uniformly
distributed.1 (E.g., to state that inside a while-loop, we have the invariant that x is a uniformly
random bit.) Or, specific to the quantum case, that a quantum variable has a certain distribution
(e.g., is in the “completely mixed state”, the quantum analogue to a uniform distribution). Or
that a quantum variable is not entangled with other variables. Or that a quantum variable
contains classical data at a certain point in the program. (Some logics distinguish classical and
quantum variables, e.g., [19], at the costs of more complex semantics. But this does not allow us
to reason about dynamic properties, e.g., that a variable becomes classical after a measurement.)
In this article, we present an extension of quantum Hoare logic that removes these limitations.
We introduce “ghost variables” and show that using ghost variables, we can encode properties such
as “x has distributionD” or “x is separable (unentangled)” or “x is classical”. (That is, all of these
are emerging properties, not hardcoded into our logic.) A ghost variable is a variable that does
not actually occur in the program but is introduced merely in a predicate (pre-/postcondition).
The ghost variable is then allowed to take any value that makes the predicate true (effectively
existentially quantified). E.g., the classical predicate x = g2 (where g is a ghost variable) would
express that x is a square. Classical ghost variables, however, do not yield any new expressive
power since existential quantifiers are already allowed in most Hoare logics (so we could state
the predicate as ∃g.x = g2). In the quantum setting, however, a ghost variable can have a
quantum state, and possibly be entangled with other variables! For example, if ψ is a maximally
entangled state between two variables, then looking at only one of those variables, we would
see a uniformly distributed variable. And a uniformly distributed variable can always be seen
as part of a system with two variables in state ψ. Thus the predicate “xe together are in state
ψ” (where e is a ghost variable) models the fact that x is uniformly distributed. Similarly we
can encode classicality and separability. Thus, using ghost variables, we can continue reasoning
about quantum programs using Hoare logic, but additionally have program invariants that state
1Classical/quantum calculi that use “expectations” (predicates that do not just hold/not hold, but hold to a
certain degree, [14, 15, 7, 20]) allow us to reason about probabilistic behavior. But they only allow us to reason
about the probability of a certain event (or the expectation value of a quantity), but not about the distribution
of value. (I.e., we can express “x has value 0 with probability at least α” but not “x is uniform”.)
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that variables are distributed in certain ways, are classical, are separable, and more. (We stress
that this even is an advance over the state of the art for classical programs. Our logic could be
used in the analysis of classical programs to express the fact that certain variables have certain
distributions. This is quite unexpected since we would be using a quantum phenomenon to
analyze purely classical programs.)
Additionally the introduction of ghost variables makes the foundations of the investigated
programming language simpler. Many operations that one thinks of as elementary (such as
random sampling, measurements) can actually be built from more elementary operations (such
as applying a unitary operation, initializing a quantum register). Using ghost variables we can
then derive the properties of the derived operations from the properties of the elementary one.
(E.g., show that after random sampling the assigned variable has a certain distribution and is
classical.) This means that the language is simpler (and thus arguably more foundationally
elegant), and the core set of rules of our logic is quite small (eleven rules).
Finally, we demonstrate that our logic can be applied to problems that seem out of reach of
existing Hoare logics: We analyze quantum one-time pad encryption and show that it is secure,
i.e., that an encrypted quantum message indeed “looks random”.
Related work. Hoare logic was first introduced by Hoare [12]. A different view was provided by
Dijkstra [8] using predicate transformers. Hoare logics/predicate transformers were generalized
by Kozen [14] (and [15] for the case of combined probabilism/nondeterminism). Quantum Hoare
logics and predicate transformer calculi for quantum programs have been presented by D’Hondt
and Panangaden [7], Chadha, Mateus and Sernadas [5], Feng, Duan, Ji, and Ying [9], Ying [20],
and Kakutani [13]. Unruh [19] gives a quantum Hoare logic for analyzing pairs of programs
(based on the classical pRHL [2]). A different approach is taken by pictorial calculi where
quantum processes can be formalized and rewritten as diagrams, starting with Abramsky and
Coecke [1]. [6, Example 4.91] applies this approach to the classical one-time pad, but only to its
correctness, not its security. The quantum one-time pad was discovered by [3, 16].
Organisation. Section 2 introduces some quantum basics as well as important notation and
auxiliary concepts. Section 3 introduces syntax and semantics of the simple imperative quantum
language we use for our calculus. (And explains how random sampling, measurements, etc. are
encoded using more basic language features.) Section 4 introduces our Hoare logic with ghosts.
(The concept of ghost variables and the semantics of Hoare judgments.) Section 5 shows how
important properties such as distributions of variables, classicality, separability can be encoded
in pre-/postconditions using ghost variables. Section 6 presents and explains the eleven core rules
of the logic from which all other rules can be derived. Section 7 derives a number of additional
rules from the core rules. (For reasoning about derived language features, and for convenient
reasoning about programs with classical variables.) Section 8 analyses the quantum one-time
pad.
2 Preliminaries: Variables, Memories, and Predicates
In this section, we introduce some fundamental concepts and notations needed for this paper,
and recap some of the needed quantum background as we go along. When introducing some
notation X , the place of definition is marked like this: X . All symbols are listed in the symbol
index.
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Variables. Before we introduce the syntax and semantics of programs, we first need to in-
troduce some basic concepts. A variable is described by a variable name x that identifies the
variable, and a type T . The type of x is simply the set of all (classical) values the variable can
take. E.g., a variable might have type {0, 1}, or N.2 We will assume that there is always some
distinguished value in T that we denote 0 .
We distinguish between three kinds of variables: program variables x,y, z (that can occur
in programs), entangled ghost variables e , and unentangled ghost variables u . We write g
for variables that are entangled ghosts or unentangled ghosts. (The meaning of these kinds will
become clear later, for now they simply form a partition of the set of all variables.) We use v,w
when we do not wish to specify the kind of variable.
Lists or sets of variables will be denoted V,W or X,Y,Z or E or U or G (depending
on the kind of variable they contain). Given a list V = v1 . . .vn of variables, we say its type is
T1 × · · · × Tn if Ti is the type of vi. We write progvars(V) for the program variables in V.
Memories and quantum states. An assignment assigns to each variable a classical value.
Formally, for a set V, the assignments over V are all functions m with domain V such that: for
all x ∈ V with type Tx, m(x) ∈ Tx. That is, assignments can represent the content of classical
memories.
To model quantum memories, we simply consider superpositions of assignments: A (pure)
quantum memory is a superposition of assignments. Formally, ℓ2[V] , the set of all quantum
memories over V, is the Hilbert space with basis3 {|m〉}m where m ranges over all assignments
overV. Here |m〉 simply denotes the basis vector labeled m, we often write |m〉V to stress which
space we are talking about. Intuitively, a quantum memory ψ over V with ‖ψ‖ = 1 represents
a state a quantum computer with variables V could be in. (We do not require ‖ψ‖ = 1 for a
quantum memories unless this is explicitly mentioned.)
We also consider quantum states over arbitrary sets X (as opposed to sets of assignments).
Namely, ℓ2(X) denotes the Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X . (In that notation,
ℓ2[V] is simply ℓ2(A) where A is the set of all assignments on V.) Elements ψ ∈ ℓ2(X) with
‖ψ‖ = 1 represent quantum states.
We often treat elements of ℓ2(T ) and ℓ2[V] interchangeably if T is the type of V since there
is a natural isorphism between those spaces.
The tensor product ⊗ combines two quantum states ψ ∈ ℓ2(X), φ ∈ ℓ2(Y ) into a joint
system ψ ⊗ φ ∈ ℓ2(X × Y ). In the case of quantum memories ψ, φ over V,W, respectively,
ψ ⊗ φ ∈ ℓ2[VW]. (And ψ ⊗ φ = φ⊗ ψ since we are composing “named” systems.)
For a vector (or operator) a, we write a∗ for its adjoint. (In the finite dimensional case,
the adjoint is simply the conjugate transpose of a vector/matrix. The literature also knows the
notation a†.) The adjoint of |x〉 is written 〈x|. We abbreviate proj(ψ) := ψψ∗. This is the
projector onto ψ when ‖ψ‖ = 1.
Mixed quantum memories. In many situations, we need to model probabilistic quantum
states (e.g., a quantum state that is |0〉 with probability 12 and |1〉 with probability
1
2 ). This
is modeled using mixed states (a.k.a. density operators). Having state ψi with probability pi is
2We stress that we do not assume that the type is a finite or even a countable set. Consequently, the Hilbert
spaces considered in this paper are not necessarily finite dimensional or even separable. However, all results can
be informally understood by thinking of all sets as finite and hence of all Hilbert spaces as CN for suitable N ∈ N.
3When we say “basis”, we always mean orthonormal basis.
4
represented by the operator ρ :=
∑
i piproj(ψi).
4 5 Then ρ encodes all observable information
about the distribution of the quantum state (that is, two distributions of quantum states have
the same ρ iff they cannot be distinguished by any physical process). And tr ρ is the total
probability
∑
i pi. (That is, tr ρ = 1 unless we wish to represent the outcome of a non-terminating
program.) We will often need to consider mixed states of quantum memories (i.e., mixed states
with underlying Hilbert space ℓ2[V]). We call them mixed (quantum) memories over V.
For a mixed memory ρ over V ⊇ W the partial trace trW ρ is the result of throwing away
variables W (i.e., it is a mixed memory over V \W). Formally, trW is defined as the continuous
linear function satisfying trW(σ ⊗ τ) := σ · tr τ where τ is an operator over W.
A mixed memory ρ is (V,W)-separable (i.e., not entangled between V and W) iff it can be
written as ρ =
∑
i ρi ⊗ ρ
′
i for mixed memories ρi, ρ
′
i over V,W, respectively.
Operations on quantum states. An operation on a quantum state is modeled by an isometry
U on ℓ2(X).6 If we apply such an operation on a mixed state ρ, the result is UρU∗.
Most often, isometries will occur in the context of operations that are performed on a single
variable or list of variables, i.e., an isometry U on ℓ2[V]. Then U can also be applied to ℓ2[W]
with W ⊇ V: we identify U with U ⊗ idW\V. Furthermore, if V has type T , then an isometry
U on ℓ2(T ) can be seen as an isometry on ℓ2[V] since we identify ℓ2(T ) and ℓ2[V]. If we want to
make W explicit, we write U onW for the isometry U on ℓ2[V]. For example, if U is a 2 × 2-
matrix and x has type bit, then U onx can be applied to quantum memories over xy, acting on
x only. This notation is not limited to isometries, of course, but applies to other operators, too.
(By “operator” we always mean a bounded linear operator in this paper.)
An important operation is CNOT on VW (where V,W both have type {0, 1}n), defined by
CNOT(|x〉V ⊗ |y〉W) := |x〉V ⊗ |x⊕ y〉W. (That is, we allow CNOT not only on single bits but
bitstrings.)
Predicates. In Hoare judgments, we need to express properties of the state of a quantum
memory. In this paper, we only consider properties that are closed under superpositions of
quantum states. That is, a predicate A,B,C on V is a subspace7 of ℓ2[V]. The syntax of
predicates will not be fixed to a specific language, i.e., any mathematically expressible subspace
is a valid predicate. But we fix some syntactic sugar for expressing predicates succinctly:
• ⊤ , ⊥ : The predicate that is always satisfied is denoted ⊤ := ℓ2[V]. The predicate that
is never satisfied is ⊥ := {0}.
• A ∧ B , A,B , A ∨ B : To model that both A and B hold (conjunction), we simply use
the intersection of A and B (as sets). That is, we write A ∧ B to denote A ∩ B. We will
often also write this as “A,B” instead of “A∧B” where “ ,” is understood to bind less closely
than “∨”. To model that A or B holds (disjunction), we use the sum A+B (the space of all
linear combinations from A and B). That is, we write A∨B to denote A+B. This choice of
connectives corresponds to Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic. But we stress that we
4Mathematically, these are the set of all positive Hermitian trace-class operators on ℓ2(X). The requirement
“trace-class” ensures that the trace exists and can be ignored in the finite-dimensional case.
5Sums without index set are always assumed to have an arbitrary (not necessarily finite or even countable)
index set. In the case of sums of vectors in a Hilbert space, convergence is with respect to the Hilbert space norm,
and in the case of sums of positive operators, the convergence is with respect to the Loewner order.
6That is, a norm-preserving linear operation. Often, one models quantum operations as unitaries instead
because in the finite-dimensional case an isometry is automatically unitary. However, in the infinite-dimensional
case, unitaries are unnecessarily restrictive. Consider, e.g., the isometry |i〉 7→ |i+ 1〉 with i ∈ N which is a
perfectly valid quantum operation but not a unitary.
7By subspace, we always mean closed subspaces. In the finite-dimensional case, all subspaces are closed anyway.
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are not restricted to using only these connectives, we may use any well-defined operations
on subspaces. These are just the ones that will turn out useful in the remainder of the
paper.
• M · A : For an operator M (typically an isometry or a projector) and a predicate A, we
write M · A for the subspace {Mψ : ψ ∈ A}. Thus, M · A is satisfied if we apply M to a
quantum memory in A.
• X ∈q S : For some variable list X of type T , we may wish to express the fact that the value
ofX lies in a certain subspace S ⊆ ℓ2(T ). Notice that S can be naturally seen as a subspace
of ℓ2[V]. Then V being in a state in S means that the state of the whole quantum memory
is in S ⊗ ℓ2[V \X]. We introduce the syntactic sugar “X ∈q S” to denote S ⊗ ℓ
2[V \X].
Note that even though it looks like a Boolean expression, it actually is a subspace of ℓ2[V]
and thus a predicate in our sense.
• W =q ψ . Often, we will also want to express that the variables W are in a specific state
ψ. This means the variables lie in span{ψ}, using the previous syntactic sugar we can write
this as W ∈q span{ψ}. We introduce the abbreviation W =q ψ for this common case.
• A{W/W′} . Renaming variables W to W′ in predicate A. This assumes A is a predicate
over V ⊇ W, that W ∩ (V \W) = ∅, and that W and W′ have the same type. Then
A{W/W′} is the predicate over (V \W) ·∪W′ defined by UW→W′ · A where UW→W′ is
the natural isomorphism between ℓ2[W] and ℓ2[W′], i.e., UW→W′ |i〉W := |i〉W′ for all i.
(UW→W′ renames W to W′ when applied to a quantum memory.)
An example Aexample of a predicate would be:(
xy =q
1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉
)
∨
(
x =q |0〉
)
, z =q |1〉
This means, intuitively, that xy are maximally entangled (in state 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 up to a global
phase factor) or x has state |0〉, and in addition z has state |1〉.
Note that our predicates seems to be lacking in expressiveness compared with the predicates,
e.g., from [19]: It is not possible to parameterize the predicate using the values of classical
variables. E.g., we cannot write y =q |x〉 where x is a classical variable. This is because
our semantics does not hardcode the distinction between classical and quantum variables (all
variables are quantum by default). But, in Section 7.2, we will see how to express classical
variables as a derived feature, and introduce additional syntactic sugar that allows us to recover
the full expressiveness of the predicates from [19].
Given a predicate A, we will often wish to indicate which variables it talks about, i.e., what
are its free variables. Since our definition of predicates is semantic (i.e., we are not limited
to predicates expressed using the syntax above) we cannot simply speak about the variables
occurring in the expression describing A. Instead, we say A contains only variables from W
(written: fv(A) ⊆ W) iff there exists a subspace S such that A = (W ∈q S). (That is, if
A can be described solely in terms of the content of the variables W.) Note that there is a
certain abuse of notation here: We formally defined “ fv(A) ⊆ W”, but we do not define fv(A);
fv(A) ⊆W should formally just be seen as an abbreviation for ∃S.A = (W ∈q S).
8 For example,
fv(Aexample) ⊆ {x,y, z}. Similarly, we treat fv(A) ∩W = ∅.
8In fact, defining fv(A) is possible only if there is a smallest set W such that ∃S. A = (W ∈q S). This is not
necessarily the case. For example, assume that V is infinite, let A be the space spanned by all |m〉 where m(v) 6= 0
for only finitely many v ∈ V. Then A = (W ∈q S) for any cofinite W (by defining S as the span of all |m〉 with
only finitely many m(v) 6= 0), but A 6= (W ∈q S) whenever W is not cofinite. Since there is no smallest cofinite
W, fv(A) cannot be defined, but we can still meaningfully use the notation fv(A) ⊆W.
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If two predicates A and A′ on variables V and W, respectively, satisfy A ⊗ ℓ2[W \V] =
A′ ⊗ ℓ2[V \W], then A and A′ intuitively describe the same property on the shared variables
V ∩W (and say nothing about the remaining variables). Therefore we will identify such A and
A′ throughout this paper. In particular, any predicate A can be seen as a predicate A′ on fv(A).
3 Quantum programs
Syntax. We will now define a small imperative quantum language. The set of all programs is
described by the following syntax:
c,d ::= apply U to X | init x | if y then c else d | while y do c | c;d | skip
Here X is a list of program variables, x a program variable, y a program variable of type {0, 1},
and U an isometry on ℓ2[X] (there is no fixed set of allowed isometries, any isometry that we
can describe can be used here).9
Intuitively, apply U to X means that the operation U is applied to the quantum variablesX.
E.g., apply H to x would apply the Hadamard gate to the variable x (we assume that H denote
the Hadamard matrix). It is important that we can apply U to several variablesX simultaneously,
otherwise no entanglement between variables can ever be produced.
The program init x initializes x with the quantum state |0〉. (Remember that we assumed
that every variable type contains a distinguished element 0.)
The program if y then c else d will measure the qubit y, and, if the outcome is 1, execute c,
otherwise execute d.
The program while y do c measures y, and if the outcome is 1, it executes c. This is
repeated until the outcome is 0.
Finally, c;d executes c and then d. And skip does nothing. We will always implicitly treat
“ ;” as associative and skip as its neutral element.
On the minimalism of the language. This language is intentionally minimalistic. It seems
to lack a number of features that are present, e.g., in [19]: Initializing variables with states
other than |0〉. Performing measurements. Probabilism (i.e., random sampling). Parameterizing
operations/states using classical variables (e.g., apply Rx to y where x is a variable of type
R, and Rθ a rotation by angle θ). All these features are very important if we want to model
anything but the simplest programs. Yet, as we will see, these features are not actually lacking.
Using syntactic sugar (introduced in this section and in Section 7.2), we can recover all those
features. Keeping the language minimal and encoding all advanced features allows us to get a
much simpler core logic. Rules for working with the advanced features can then be derived from
the core features.
Semantics. The denotational semantics of our programs c are represented as functions JcK
on the mixed memories over Xall, defined by recursion on the structure of the programs. Here
Xall is a fixed set of program variables, and we will assume that fv(c) ⊆ Xall for all pro-
grams in this paper.10 The obvious cases are JskipK := id and Jc;dK := JdK ◦ JcK. And applica-
tion of an isometry U is also fairly straightforward given the syntactic sugar introduced above:
Japply U to XK(ρ) := (U onX)ρ(U onX)∗.
9We will assume throughout the paper that all programs satisfy those well-typedness constraints. In particular,
rules may implicitly impose type constraints on the variables and constants occurring in them by this assumption.
10We fix some set Xall in order to avoid a more cumbersome notation JcKX where we explicitly indicate the set
X of program variables with respect to which the semantics is defined.
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Initialization of a quantum variable is slightly more complicated: init x initializes the variable
x with |0〉, which is the same as removing x, and then creating a new variable x with content
|0〉. Removing x is done by the operation trx (partial trace, see page 5). And creating a new
variable x is done by the operation ⊗proj(|0〉x). Thus we define Jinit xK(ρ) := trx ρ⊗ proj(|0〉x).
The if-command first performs a measurement and then branches. A measurement is de-
scribed by one projector for each outcome. In our case, proj(|i〉)ony corresponds to out-
come i = 0, 1. We then have that the state after measurement (without renormalization) is
(proj(|i〉)ony)ρ(proj(|i〉)ony)∗. Then c or d is applied to that state and the resulting states are
added together to get the final mixed state. Altogether:
Jif y then c else dK(ρ) := JcK
(
↓1(ρ)
)
+ JdK
(
↓0(ρ)
)
where ↓i(ρ) := (proj(|i〉)ony)ρ(proj(|i〉)ony)
∗
While-commands are modeled similar: In an execution of a while statement, we have n ≥ 0
iterations of “measure with outcome 1 and run c” (which applies JcK ◦ ↓1 to the state), followed
by “measure with outcome 0” (which applies ↓0 to the state). Adding all those branches up, we
get the definition:
Jwhile y do cK(ρ) :=
∞∑
n=0
↓0
(
(JcK ◦ ↓1)
n(ρ)
)
Syntactic sugar. To work productively with the minimal language from above, we introduce
some syntactic sugar:
• X
q
← ψ (initialization with quantum state): To assign a quantum state ψ ∈ ℓ2(T ) to
variablesX of type T , we have to do the following: We fix an isometry Uψ with U |0, . . . , 0〉 =
ψ. And then we initialize all X with |0〉 and apply U . That is, X
q
← ψ abbreviates
“init x1; . . . ; init xn; apply Uψ to X” with x1 . . .xn := X and some arbitrary isometry
Uψ|0, . . . , 0〉 := ψ. (Such Uψ is not unique but always exists.)
• X← z (classical initialization / assign-statement): This is short for X
q
← |z〉. (We assume
that z is in the type of X.)
• Y ←measure X (measurement). We wish to simulate a measurement in the com-
putational basis using the commands from our minimal language. It is a well-known
(and easy to check) fact that measuring X and assigning |z〉 to Y (where z is the out-
come) is equivalent to performing a CNOT from X to a |0〉-initialized Y and to a
|0〉-initialized auxiliary register and discarding the auxiliary register. This can be ex-
pressed using our language: We define Y ← measure X to denote “Y
q
← |0〉; z
q
←
|0〉; apply CNOT to XY; apply CNOT to Xz; z
q
← |0〉” where z is a fresh variable of
the same type as Y and X. (I.e., z is a variable that is used nowhere else.)
Similarly, we can also define a measurement of X that does not remember the outcome.
(That is, its effect is merely to change the measured variables.) We write measure X to
denote “z
q
← |0〉; apply CNOT to Xz; z
q
← |0〉” where z is a fresh variable of the same type
as X.
(Of course, it is also possible to model measurements other than computational basis mea-
surements. To implement a projective measurement described by projectors {Pi}i, we
simply replace CNOT by the unitary
∑
i Pi ⊗U⊕i where U⊕i : |z〉 7→ |z ⊕ i〉. We do not fix
a specific syntax for this construction.)
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• X
$
← D (random sampling). Here D is a discrete probability distribution over T , the type
of X. Sampling for D is easily done by initializing X in the state ψD :=
∑
i∈T
√
D(i)|i〉
and then measuring that state in the computational basis (leaving X in state |i〉 with
probability D(i)). That is, X
$
← D is shorthand for “X
q
← ψD;measure X.”
4 Hoare Logic with Ghosts
Recap Hoare logic. Before we introduce our Hoare logic with ghost variables, we quickly recap
regular quantum Hoare logic.11 Intuitively, a Hoare triple {A} c {B} means: If the initial state
ρ of the program c satisfies A, and we run the program B, then the final state JcK(ρ) satisfies B.
Since the states of programs in our semantics are mixed memories ρ (i.e., density operators), we
need to first define what it means for a mixed memory to satisfy a predicate. For this, the notion
of support of a density operator comes in handy: A density operator can always be represented
as ρ =
∑
i proj(ψi), and intuitively this means that ρ is a mixture of states ψi. (But note that
this decomposition is not unique!) Then supp ρ := span{ψi}i is simply the subspace spanned
by all the vectors that constitute ρ.12 (Fortunately, this definition turns out to be independent of
the choice of ψi.) Now, if A is a predicate over the program variables X
all (formally: a subspace
of ℓ2[Xall]), and ρ is a mixed memory over Xall, then ρ satisfies A (written ρ  A) iff supp ρ ⊆ A.
(I.e., iff ρ is a mixture of quantum memories in A.) With this notation (that will be changed
somewhat later to accommodate ghost variables), we can formally define {A} c {B} as: for all
ρ  A we have JcK(ρ)  B. (We call A the precondition and B the postcondition.) For this logic,
we can then prove a number of rules that allow us to derive the behavior of a complex quantum
program from the behavior of its elementary building blocks. For example, the (very easy to
prove) Seq rule shows that {A} c {B} and {B}d {C} implies {A} c;d {C}. This allows us to break
down the analysis of a sequence of commands into an analysis of the individual commands. (And
similar rules exist for quantum operations, while-loops, etc.)
However, this Hoare logic is somewhat limited in its expressivity. For example, we cannot
express the fact that the variable x is uniformly randomly distributed. Say c samples x
$
← D
where D is the uniform distribution. Then the final state is ρ =
∑
i∈T
1
|T |proj(|i〉) where T is
the type of x, and supp ρ = span{|i〉}i∈T = ℓ2[x] = ⊤. So the only postcondition for this c is
⊤, the trivial postcondition. So the above quantum Hoare logic forgets about the distribution
of x and remembers only what values have non-zero probability. (I.e., probabilism is treated
as possibilistic nondeterminism.) For similar reasons, we cannot express, say, that x is classical
(e.g., after the program measure x).
Extensions of this basic quantum Hoare logic can make some statements about probabilities:
Quantum Hoare logic whose pre-/postconditions are expectations [7, 20] can, e.g., express that
a certain predicate will hold with a certain probability. And [19] can express that the outputs
of two programs are identical, even taking into account their distributions. But both still lack
the possibility of stating, as part of a pre-/postcondition, e.g., that a variable has a particu-
lar distribution. See also discussion in Section 8.2 for further discussion on the limitations of
11Strictly speaking, “recap” is not the right word since as far as we know this variant of quantum Hoare logic
has not explicitly been spelled out in the literature. However, we still consider it folklore because it is a relatively
simple generalization of [4] (allowing for more general programs, density operator based semantics, and changing
the presentation from weakest precondition transformers to Hoare triples), it is a simplification of [19] (which
considers pairs of programs instead of single programs), and it is a special case of [20] (by considering only “strict”
predicates there, i.e., predicates that are projectors, we get a logic that is roughly the same).
12The usual formal definition of supp ρ is supp ρ := imP where P is the smallest projector such that PρP ∗ = ρ.
(This definition has the advantage of not requiring a specific choice of decomposition of ρ.) But it is easy to verify
that this definition coincides with span{ψi}i.
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those logics.
Ghost variables. Our solution to this problem is the introduction of “ghost variables” (which
will will often simply call “ghosts” for brevity). In our context, a ghost variable is a variable
that cannot occur in the program (nor in the memory of the program) but only in predicates.
The intuitive meaning of a ghost variable is that it can take any value that makes a predicate
true. To illustrate the idea, let us forget about quantum programs for a moment and consider
the classical case: For example, the classical postcondition x = g2 would mean that after the
execution of the program, the variable x contains the square of g, if x and g are both program
variables of type N. But if g is a ghost, then x = g2 is true whenever there is some way to assign
an integer to g that makes x = g2 true. In other words, the postcondition x = g2 is equivalent
to just saying that x is a square. Now, in the classical case this is not very impressive: x = g2 is
just equivalent to ∃z.x = z2. And any other predicate involving ghosts can also be rewritten into
a regular predicate by using existential quantifiers. So, at least if we allow existential quantifiers
in predicates (and there is no reason why we should not), ghost variables are useless for classical
Hoare logic.13 However, this argument does not apply in the quantum case. A quantum ghost
variable cannot just be simulated using an existential quantifier (e.g., because ghost variables
might be entangled with quantum variables).
So, how can we formalize ghost variables in the quantum setting? A classical memory m
(containing only program variables) satisfies a predicate A involving ghosts iff there exists a
larger memory m◦ containing both program and ghost variables such that m◦ satisfies A, and
m is the result of removing all ghosts from m◦. The quantum analogue of removing variables is
the partial trace. That is, if we have a mixed memory ρ on XG, then ρX := trG ρ is the result
of removing all ghosts G from ρ. Thus, we are ready for our first tentative definition: ρ  A iff
there exists a density operator ρ◦ on XG such that trG ρ◦ = ρ and supp ρ◦ ⊆ A.
Note that in the previous definition, the program variables X and the ghost variables G can
be entangled in arbitrary ways (since we put no restriction on ρ◦). However, there is a different
possibility of defining ghost variables: We could additionally require that ρ◦ is (X,G)-separable.
That would mean that ghost and program variables may not be entangled. This will lead to a
very different behavior of ghost variables. It will turn out that both variants have their uses,
so in our logic we will simply consider both variants: We consider two kinds of ghost variables,
entangled ghost variables E and unentangled ghost variables U. That is, A may contain both
entangled and unentangled ghosts, and ρ◦ is required to be (XE,U)-separable. This means that
the variables U cannot be entangled with the program variables X, but the variable E can be!
Formal definitions. We can now mold all these ideas into a formal definition:
Definition 1 (Satisfying a predicate with ghosts) Let ρ be a mixed memory over X. Let A
be a predicate over XEU. Then a density operator ρ over X satisfies A (written ρ  A ) iff there
exists a (XE,U)-separable mixed memory ρ◦ over XEU such that supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and trEU ρ◦ = ρ.
Recall that we use different letters for different kinds of variables (cf. page 4), so the above
definition implicitly assumes that X are program variables, E are entangled ghost variables,
and U are unentangled ghost variables. In the remainder of this work, we assume that these
conventions are understood. Note that if E = U = ∅, then Definition 1 specializes to the
definition given in the recap above, namely ρ  A ⇐⇒ supp ρ ⊆ A.
Given the definition of satisfying a predicate, it is straightforward to define our Hoare logic:
13Which is, most likely, why they have not been considered before.
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Definition 2 (Hoare logic with ghosts) Let A be a predicate over XallEU, and B a predicate
over XallE′U′, and c a program.
Then {A} c {B} iff for all mixed memories ρ over Xall with ρ  A, we have that JcK(ρ)  B.
Note that A and B do not need to use the same ghosts. Ghosts are local to the interpretation of
a given predicate. In particular, if ghost variables are chosen in a particular way when showing
ρ  A, this does not mean that they have to be chosen in a related way in ρ  B!
Example. Consider the following situation. We have two variables x,y of type {0, 1}. Initially,
they are entangled in the state ψ := 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉. Now we initialize y with |0〉. What do we
know about x? The initial state of x,y is represented by the predicate xy =q ψ in our notation
(see page 6). So, we are asking for a predicate B involving x such that {xy =q ψ} init y {B}
holds. Since x is initially entangled with y, and y is “overwritten” (thus effectively deleted), x is
afterwards entangled with a ghost (in a sense, the ghost of the deleted y). That is, B = (xe =q ψ).
(The Init rule below will allow us to make this reasoning rigorous.) And, as we will see later,
xe =q ψ means that x is a uniformly random bit. So we have derived that after deleting half of
an EPR pair ψ, we get a uniformly random bit. (This matches what we know about EPR pairs.)
About the sets of ghost variables. The careful reader may have noticed that there is an
ambiguity in our notation. On page 7, we said that we identify predicates over different sets of
variables as long as they coincide on their free variables. But that means that for a state ρ over
X, when interpreting ρ  A according to Definition 1, we do not know what the sets E,U are in
that definition (we only know that EU ⊇ fv(A) \X). Fortunately, the following lemma shows
that the choice of EU is irrelevant, so our notational choice is justified. (Note that there is no
ambiguity concerning the set X of program variables since that set is determined by the type of
the mixed memory ρ.)
Lemma 1 (Irrelevance of sets of ghosts) Let ρ be a mixed memory over X. Let ρ EU A
denote ρ  A (as in Definition 1) where A is interpreted as a predicate over XEU.
Assume that E1U1,E2U2 ⊇ fv(A) \X. Then ρ 
E1U1 A iff ρ E2U2 A.
Proof. For clarity, we write AV when we interpret A as a predicate over V.
Due to symmetry, we only need to prove ρ E1U1 A =⇒ ρ E2U2 A. Assume ρ E1U1
A. Then there exists a (XE1,U1)-separable mixed memory ρ
◦ over XE1U1 with supp ρ◦ ⊆
AXE1U1 and trE1U1 ρ
◦ = ρ.
Let ρ˜◦ := trE1U1\E2U2 ρ
◦. Then ρ˜◦ is a mixed memory over X(E1 ∩ E2)(U1 ∩U2). And
since ρ◦ was (XE1,U1)-separable, ρ˜◦ is (X(E1∩E2),U1∩U2)-separable. And since supp ρ◦ ⊆
AXE1U1 , we have supp ρ˜
◦ ⊆ AX(E1∩E2)(U1∩U2). (The last step uses thatX(E1∩E2)(U1∩U2) ⊇
fv(A).)
Let ρˆ◦ := ρ˜◦ ⊗ σE2\E1 ⊗ σU2\U1 where σE2\E1 and σU2\U1 are arbitrary mixed memories
of trace 1 over E2 \ E1 and U2 \ U1, respectively. Then ρˆ
◦ is is (XE2,U2) = (X(E1 ∩
E2)(E2 \E1), (U1 ∩U2)(U2 \U1))-separable since ρ˜
◦ is (X(E1 ∩E2),U1 ∩U2)-separable. And
supp ρˆ◦ ⊆ supp ρ˜◦ ⊗ ℓ2[E2U2 \E1U1] ⊆ AX(E1∩E2)(U1∩U2) ⊗ ℓ
2[E2U2 \E1U1] = AXE2U2 .
Furthermore
trE2U2 ρˆ
◦ = tr(E1∩E2)(U1∩U2) ρ˜
◦ = tr(E1∩E2)(U1∩U2) trE1U1\E2U2 ρ
◦ = trE1U1 ρ
◦ = ρ.
Thus ρ E2U2 A. 
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5 Predicates with Ghosts
In this section, we describe three important kinds of predicates that can be expressed using
ghosts.
5.1 Variables with a certain distribution
First, we show that entangled ghosts can be used to express that a variable has a certain dis-
tribution. Given a distribution D on T , we define ψDD :=
∑
i
√
D(i) |i〉 ⊗ |i〉, a state on two
variables of type T . This state has the property that, if we erase (or measure) the second part,
we get a D-distributed classical value |i〉 in the first part. So, if xe is in state ψDD, then, since
e is a ghost, e is, in effect, erased. Thus the predicate xe = ψDD effectively means that x is
D-distributed. Thus we introduce syntactic sugar for predicates:
• distrib(X, D) (X is D-distributed). distrib(X, D) is short for Xe =q ψDD where e is
a fresh entangled ghost (i.e., one that does not occur elsewhere in the predicate we are
formulating) of the same type as X.
• uniform(X) (X is uniformly distributed). This is short for distrib(X, D) where D is the
uniform distribution on the type of X.
(As a special case, if D is the uniform distribution on a single bit, then ψDD is the state ψ
from the example in the previous section. So the postcondition B in that example can indeed be
written as uniform(x) as was already hinted there.)
So far, we gave only a relatively hand-waving explanation why distrib(X, D) means that X
is D-distributed. But the following lemma makes this formal:
Lemma 2 (Distribution predicates) Let D be a distribution over T . Let ρ be a mixed mem-
ory over Y. Let X ⊆ Y have type T . Let ρD :=
∑
iD(i)proj(|i〉) be a mixed memory over X.
(I.e., ρD contains a D-distributed classical value i.) Then the following are equivalent:
• ρ  distrib(X, D).
• There exists a mixed memory ρ′ over Y \X such that ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρD.
In other words, distrib(X, D) means that X is D-distributed and independent of other variables.
Proof. First, we check that ρD is the result of removing variable e from the quantum memory
ψDD (we interpret ψDD as a quantum memory over Xe):
tre proj(ψDD) = tre proj
(∑
i
√
D(i)|i〉X ⊗ |i〉e
)
=
∑
i
D(i)proj(|i〉X) = ρD. (1)
distrib(X, D) is syntactic sugar for Xe =q ψDD and thus is a predicate over some variables
YEU with X ⊆ Y and e ∈ E.
“=⇒”: First we show that if ρ  distrib(X, D), then ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρD for some ρ′. Since ρ 
distrib(X, D), there exists a ρ◦ over YEU with supp ρ◦ ⊆ distrib(X, D) and trEU ρ◦ = ρ.
Thus ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψi) for some ψi with
ψi ∈ distrib(X, D) = (Xe =q ψDD) = span{ψDD} ⊗ ℓ
2[Xe∁].
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Hence ψi = ψDD ⊗ ψ
′
i for some ψ
′
i over YEU \Xe. Thus
ρ = trEU ρ
◦ = trEU
∑
i
proj(ψDD)⊗ proj(ψ
′
i) = tre proj(ψDD)⊗ trEU\e
∑
i
proj(ψ′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′
(1)
= ρD ⊗ ρ
′.
This shows the =⇒-direction.
“⇐=”: We next show that if ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρD, then ρ  distrib(X, D). Let ρ◦ := ρ′ ⊗ proj(ψDD)⊗
σE\e ⊗ σU for some arbitrary mixed memories σE\e, σU of trace 1 on E \ e and U, respec-
tively. The ρ◦ is (YE,U)-separable and supp ρ◦ ⊆ span{ψDD} ⊗ ℓ2
[
(Xe)∁
]
= distrib(X, D).
Furthermore, trEU ρ
◦ = ρ′ ⊗ tre proj(ψDD)
(1)
= ρ′ ⊗ ρD. This shows the ⇐=-direction. 
We will see examples of this predicate in the rule Sample for sampling statements (y
$
← D),
and in our analysis of the quantum one-time-pad in Section 8.3.
5.2 Separable variables
A concept specific to the quantum setting is for a variable to be separable, i.e., not entangled
with any other variables. (But a separable variable may be probabilistically correlated!)
Expressing that a variable x is separable seems, at the first glance, impossible to do using
predicates (that are modeled as subspaces): Such a predicate would have to contain, e.g., the
states |00〉xy and |11〉xy (since in both cases, x and y are equal but not entangled) but not the
state 1√
2
|00〉xy +
1√
2
|11〉xy. But that would mean that the predicate is not closed under linear
combinations, hence not a subspace.
Yet, by introducing ghosts, we can model separable variables. To understand how, we first
need to recall a concept from [19], namely the quantum equality (between two variables):
Definition 3 (Quantum equality [19, Defs. 22, 23]) Let W,W′ ⊆ V be disjoint lists of
quantum variables. (W and W′ have the same type.) Let SWAP be the unitary that swaps the
content of W and W′. That is, SWAP
(
|i〉W ⊗ |j〉W′ ⊗ ψ
′′) := |j〉W ⊗ |i〉W′ ⊗ψ′′ for all i, j ∈ T
and all quantum memories ψ′′ over V \WW′.
Then W ≡q W
′ is the set of all quantum memories ψ on V such that SWAPψ = ψ.14
([19] also presents a number of useful lemmas for rewriting and simplifying predicates involv-
ing ≡q.)
In other words, we consider W and W′ to have equal content (W ≡q W′) iff a state is
invariant under swapping W and W′. Now, it turns out that if W ≡q W′, but W and W′
are not entangled with each other, then W and W′ also cannot be entangled with any other
variables:
Lemma 3 (Quantum equality & separable states [19, Coro. 25]) Fix quantum memo-
ries ψ over V ⊇ W and ψ′ over V′ ⊇ W′. Then ψ ⊗ ψ′ ∈ (W ≡q W′) iff ψ and ψ′ are
of the form ψ = ψW ⊗ ψV\W and ψ′ = ψ′W′ ⊗ ψ
′
V′\W′ and ψW = ψ
′
W′
15 for some quantum
memories ψW, ψV\W, ψW′ , ψV′\W′ over W,V \W,W′,V′ \W′, respectively.
14The original definition of ≡q is more general because we can write something like Ux ≡q U ′y meaning that
x and y are equal up to operations U, V . Since we will no explicitly make use of this in this paper, we only gave
the definition of the special case here. But the more general definition is, of course, also admissible in predicates
as defined here.
15Up to renaming of variables, formally ψW = UW′→W ψ
′
W′
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But this means that a program variable x is separable iff x ≡q u for some unentangled ghost!
(Remember from Definition 1 that an unentangled ghost u will, by definition, not be entangled
with x) Thus we can introduce the following syntactic sugar for predicates:
• separable(X) (X is separable). separable(X) is short for X ≡q u where u is a fresh un-
entangled ghost (i.e., one that does not occur elsewhere in the predicate we are formulating)
of the same type as X.
The following lemma formalizes our informal reasoning above, separable(X) indeed charac-
terizes separability:
Lemma 4 (Separability predicates) Let ρ be a mixed memory on Y. Let X ⊆ Y. Then the
following are equivalent:
• ρ  separable(X).
• ρ is (X,Y \X)-separable.
Proof. separable(X) is syntactic sugar for X ≡q u and thus is a predicate over some variables
YEU with X ⊆ Y and u ∈ U. And X and u have the same type.
“=⇒”: First we show that if ρ  separable(X), then ρ is (X,Y \ X)-separable. Since
ρ  separable(X), there exists a (YE,U)-separable ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆ separable(X) and
trEU ρ
◦ = ρ. Thus ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψYE,i ⊗ ψU,i) for some ψYE,i, ψU,i over YE and U, respec-
tively. Then
ψYE,i ⊗ ψU,i ∈ supp ρ
◦ ⊆ separable(X) = (X ≡q u).
By Lemma 3, this implies that ψYE,i = ψX,i ⊗ ψYE\X,i for some ψX,i, ψYE\X,i over X and
YE \ X, respectively. Thus proj(ψYE,i) is (X,YE \ X)-separable. Thus trE proj(ψYE,i) is
(X,Y \X)-separable. Hence
ρ = trEU ρ
◦ =
∑
i
trE proj(ψYE,i)
is (X,Y \X)-separable as well. This shows the =⇒-direction.
“⇐=”: We next show that if ρ is (X,Y \ X)-separable, then ρ  separable(X). Since ρ is
(X,Y \ X)-separable, ρ =
∑
i proj(ψX,i ⊗ ψY\X,i) for some quantum memories ψX,i, ψY\X,i
over X and Y \X, respectively. Without loss of generality, ‖ψX,i‖ = 1. Let
ψ◦i := ψX,i ⊗ ψY\X,i ⊗ ψE,i ⊗ ψu,i ⊗ ψU\u,i
where ψE,i, ψU\u,i are arbitrary quantum memories of norm 1 on E and U\u, respectively, and
ψu,i := ψX,i except that ψu,i is a quantum memory over u and not over X. By Lemma 3, ψ
◦
i ∈
(X ≡q u). Let ρ
◦ :=
∑
i proj(ψ
◦
i ). Then ρ
◦ is (YE,U)-separable and supp ρ◦ = span{ψ◦i }i ⊆
(X ≡q u) = separable(X). And
trEU ρ
◦ =
∑
i
proj(ψX,i ⊗ ψY\X,i) = ρ.
(Using that ψE,i, ψu,i, ψU\u,i all have norm 1.) Hence ρ  separable(X). This shows the
⇐=-direction. 
As an example for the relationship between different predicates, notice that distrib(x, D) im-
plies separable(x) since distrib(x, D) implies that x is distributed independently from all other
14
variables (Lemma 2). This also follows within our logic by an application of the rule Transmute
below, see the example after rule Transmute.
5.3 Classical variables
A third application of ghost variables is to formulate predicates that imply that a variable has
a classical state. We say a mixed memory ρ over Y is classical in X ⊆ Y iff it is of the form
ρ =
∑
i proj(|i〉X)⊗ ρi for some mixed memories ρi over Y \X. (This is often called a cq-state.)
Expressing that a variable x is classical seems, at the first glance, impossible to do using
predicates (that are modeled as subspaces): Such a predicate would have to contain, e.g., the
states |0〉x and |1〉x (since those are classical) but not the state
1√
2
|0〉x+
1√
2
|1〉x. But that would
mean that the predicate is not closed under linear combinations, hence not a subspace.
Yet, by introducing ghosts, we can model classicality. In order to see how, we introduce a
different equality notion between quantum variables, ≡cl. Intuitively, two variables are classically
equal iff measuring both in the computational basis will always give the same outcome. (So, |0〉x
and |0〉y would be classically equal, but
1√
2
|0〉x +
1√
2
|1〉x and
1√
2
|0〉y +
1√
2
|1〉y would not be.
16)
Formally:
Definition 4 (Classical equality) Let W,W′ ⊆ V be disjoint lists of quantum variables. (W
and W′ have the same type T .)
Then W ≡cl W
′ is the span of all quantum memories of the form |i〉W ⊗ |i〉W′ ⊗ ψ with
i ∈ T and ψ a quantum memory on V \WW′.
If we think of two variables x,u both having the same state ψ, then x ≡cl u holds if ψ = |i〉 for
some i (i.e., if ψ is a classical state). But if ψ is a superposition of different |i〉, then measuring
both x and u in the computational basis gives different results with non-zero probability. Hence
x 6≡cl u in that case. This suggests that x is classical iff it is classically equal to some unentangled
ghost variable u.17 That is, we introduce the following syntactic sugar for predicates:
• class(X) (X is classical). class(X) is short for X ≡cl u where u is a fresh unentangled
ghost (i.e., one that does not occur elsewhere in the predicate we are formulating) of the
same type as X.
The following lemma formalizes our informal reasoning above, class(X) indeed characterizes
classicality:
Lemma 5 (Classicality predicates) Let ρ be a mixed memory over Y. Let X ⊆ Y. Then
the following are equivalent:
• ρ  class(X).
• ρ is classical in X. (As defined at the beginning of this section.)
Proof. class(X) is syntactic sugar for X ≡cl u and thus is a predicate over some variables
YEU with X ⊆ Y and u ∈ U.
“=⇒”: First we show that if ρ  class(X), then ρ is classical in X. Since ρ  class(X),
there exists a (YE,U)-separable ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆ class(X) and trEU ρ◦ = ρ. Thus ρ◦ =∑
i proj(ψYE,i ⊗ ψU,i) for some ψYE,i, ψU,i over YE and U, respectively. Without loss of
generality, ‖ψU,i‖ 6= 0 for all i. And ψYE,i ⊗ψU,i ∈ supp ρ
◦ ⊆ class(X). Fix some i. (We will
16Somewhat counterintuitively, x and y are also classically equal if they are in the entangled state 1√
2
|00〉xy +
1√
2
|11〉xy . But this will not matter in our setting since we will apply ≡cl only to unentangled variables.
17Classical equality to some entangled ghost would not be sufficient due to the situation described in footnote 16.
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omit i from the subscripts for now.) We can write ψYE and ψU as ψYE =
∑
j λj |j〉X⊗ψYE\X,j
and ψU =
∑
j λ
′
j |j〉u ⊗ ψU\u,j. Since ψU 6= 0, we have λ
′
j∗ 6= 0 for some j
∗. If λj 6= 0 for
some j 6= j∗, then ψYE ⊗ ψU is not in the span of states |ν〉X ⊗ |ν〉u ⊗ . . . and thus not in
class(X) = (X ≡cl u). Hence λj 6= 0 for all j 6= j
∗. Thus ψYE = |j∗〉X ⊗ λj∗ψYE\X,j∗ . Hence
proj(ψYE) is classical in X. Hence trE proj(ψYE) is classical in X. Now we “unfix” i. Thus all
trE proj(ψYE,i) are classical in X. Hence
ρ = trEU ρ
◦ =
∑
i
trE proj(ψYE,i)
is classical in X. This shows the =⇒-direction.
“⇐=”: We next show that if ρ is classical in X then ρ  class(X). Since ρ is classical in X,
ρ =
∑
i proj(|i〉X)⊗ proj(ψY\X,i) for some quantum memories ψY\X,i over Y \X. Let
ρ◦ :=
∑
i
proj(|i〉X)⊗ proj(ψY\X,i)⊗ σE ⊗ proj(|i〉u)⊗ σU\u
for arbitrary mixed memories σE, σU\u of trace 1 over E andU\u, respectively. Each summand
has support in (X ≡cl u) = class(X), hence supp ρ
◦ ⊆ class(X). And ρ◦ is (YE,U)-separable.
Finally, trEU ρ
◦ =
∑
i proj(|i〉)X ⊗ proj(ψY\X,i) = ρ. Thus ρ  class(X). This shows the ⇐=-
direction. 
The predicate class(X) occurs for example in the rules Measure*, MeasureForget*, and
Sample* for measurements and random sampling. We discuss the predicate class(X) and its
uses in greater depth in Section 7.2.
6 Core Rules
In this section, we present the core reasoning rules for our logic. Since we have defined the
logic semantically (Definition 2), the set of rules is not fixed a priori (since we can always prove
additional rules sound). Nevertheless, we identify a set of important rules (one per language
primitive, plus some useful structural rules) that form the basis of the rest of this paper. In
particular, all “derived rules” in Section 7 are a consequence of these core rules. That is, after
this section we can “forget” Definition 2 and build only on the rules from this section. (Convenient
additional rules will be derived in later sections as corollaries.)
6.1 Rules for individual statements
For each command of our language (sequence, skip, initialization, application, if, while), we
introduce one rule that derives a Hoare judgment for that command from judgments about
its subterms. The rules for sequence and skip are quite obvious and follow directly from the
definition:
Seq
{A} c {B} {B}d {C}
{A} c;d {C}
Skip
A ⊆ B
{A} skip {B}
More interesting are the rules for operations on quantum states (isometries, initialization):
Apply{
A
}
apply U to X
{
(U onX) · A
} Init{
A
}
init x
{
A{e/x}, x =q |0〉
}
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Apply says that applying an isometry U to variables X has the effect of multiplying the pred-
icate A with U (after suitably lifting U to operate on quantum memories, see page 5 for the
definition of U onX). Init is more interesting because it is the first rule that introduces ghosts.
Since initialization “overwrites” the original value of x, x becomes an engangled ghost, thus the
precondition A is replaced by A{e/x}, i.e., x is replaced by a fresh ghost e. (e is fresh, i.e.,
/∈ fv(A), because otherwise {e/x} would not be welltyped.) Additionally, x will afterwards be in
the state |0〉, so the postcondition additionally contains x =q |0〉. The rules Apply and Init are
shown in Lemmas 10 and 11 in Section 6.3.
The rules for if and while do not introduce ghosts and are the same as in “regular” quantum
Hoare logic:
If{(
proj(|1〉)onx
)
· A
}
c
{
B
} {(
proj(|0〉)onx
)
· A
}
d
{
B
}
{A} if x then c else d {B}
While{(
proj(|1〉)onx
)
· A
}
c
{
A
}
{
A
}
while x do c
{(
proj(|0〉) onx
)
· A
}
Since the if-statement measures x before executing c or d (see Section 3), the precondition A
becomes
(
proj(|1〉)onx
)
· A when that measurement returns 1 and c is executed (as proj(|1〉) is
the projector corresponding to measurement outcome 1), and it becomes
(
proj(|0〉)onx
)
· A if
the measurement returns 0 and d is executed. Thus analyzing if x then A else B reduces to
analyzing c and d with those two respective preconditions.
Similarly, while x do c executes c after measuring x and getting 1. Thus, if we use A as the
loop invariant, the postcondition for the loop body becomes (proj(|1〉)onx) · A. And to end the
loop, the measurement of x must return 0, hence we get the postcondition (proj(|0〉)onx) ·A for
the overall loop. The rules If and While are proven in Lemmas 12 and 13 in Section 6.3.
6.2 Further core rules
Besides the per-statement rules from the previous section, we will use five more rules, related
to case-distinctions and to the modification of ghosts. First, we consider case-distinctions. In
classical Hoare logic, we can easily show the following rule: ∀z. {x = z, A} c {B} =⇒ {A} c {B}.
That is, to show {A} c {B}, it is sufficient to consider each possible value z of x separately and
prove {A} c {B} under the additional assumption that x = z holds in the precondition. An
immediate quantum analogue would be: ∀ψ. {x =q ψ, A} c {B} =⇒ {A} c {B}. There are two
problems with such this rule. First, it does not hold in this generality: x =q ψ implies that x
is not entangled with any other variables (because it is in the specific pure state ψ), so proving
{x =q ψ, A} c {B} for all ψ does not guarantee anything about the behavior of c in the presence
of entanglement.18 And even if we fix this by adding suitable extra conditions, the rule will force
us to always quantify over all possible ψ. But if, for example, x is guaranteed to be classical
(e.g., A = class(x)) then we would like to only consider the cases x = |z〉. To formulate a rule
that solves both problems, we introduce an additional concept:
Definition 5 (Disentangling) A predicate A on XU is M -disentangling (for a setM ⊆ ℓ2[X])
iff: For all sets of variables V (disjoint from XU), all quantum memories ψVX 6= 0 over VX,
and all quantum memories ψU 6= 0 over U with ψVX ⊗ ψU ∈ A, we have that ψVX = ψV ⊗ ψX
for some ψV ∈ ℓ
2[V] and some ψX ∈M .
What does this definition mean? Roughly speaking, it means that if variables X and U, jointly,
satisfy A, and variables U are not entangled with variables X or V, then we know that variables
18Formally, a counterexample would be: A := (xy =q |00〉 + |11〉), B := ⊥, and c := skip. Then for all ψ,
(x =q ψ, A) = ⊥, hence {x =q ψ, A} skip {B}. But {A} c {B} does not hold.
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X are also not entangled with variables V, and additionally that variables X will be in one of
the states in M .
A trivial example would be A := (xu = φ1 ⊗ φ2) which is {φ1}-disentangling. That is, if xu
are in state φ1 ⊗ φ2, then x is in state φ1 (unsurprisingly). Similarly, for any non-separable φ,
S = span{φ} is ∅-disentangling (as the variables xu cannot at the same time be non-entangled
and in state φ). The following lemma gives two more interesting examples of disentangling
predicates:
Lemma 6 Let T be the type of X. Then X ≡q U and separable(X) are ℓ
2[X]-disentangling.
And X ≡cl U and class(X) are {|i〉}i∈T -disentangling.
Proof. We first show that X ≡q U is ℓ
2[X]-disentangling. (This also implies that separable(X)
is ℓ2[X]-disentangling since separable(X) is simply syntactic sugar for X ≡q u.) Fix some
variables V, and quantum memories ψVX and ψU over VX and U, respectively, with ψVX ⊗
ψU ∈ (X ≡q U). By Lemma 3 (with V := VX, W := X, V
′ := W′ := U), this implies
that ψVX can be written as ψVX = ψV ⊗ ψX for some quantum memories ψV, ψX over V,X,
respectively. And trivially, ψX ∈ ℓ
2[X]. Thus X ≡q U is ℓ
2[X]-disentangling by Definition 5.
Now we show that X ≡cl U is {|i〉}i∈T -disentangling. (This also implies that class(X)
is {|i〉}i∈T -disentangling since class(X) is simply syntactic sugar for X ≡cl u.) Fix some
variables V, and quantum memories ψVX and ψU over VX and U, respectively, with ψVX ⊗
ψU ∈ (X ≡cl U) and ψU 6= 0. By Definition 5, we need to show that ψVX = ψV ⊗ |i〉X for
some i ∈ T and ψV over V. We decompose ψVX =
∑
λiψV,i ⊗ |i〉X and ψU =
∑
λ′i|i〉U for
some ψV,i 6= 0 over V. Since ψU 6= 0, there exists a j such that λ
′
j 6= 0. If λi 6= 0 for some
i 6= j, then ψVX⊗ψU is not in the span of states of the form |ν〉X⊗|ν〉U⊗ . . . , in contradiction
to ψVX ⊗ ψU ∈ (X ≡cl U). Thus λi = 0 for all i 6= j, hence ψVX = λjψV,j ⊗ |j〉X as desired.
Thus X ≡cl U is {|i〉}i∈T -disentangling. 
Armed with the definition of disentangling predicates, we can formulate the rule for case
distinctions:
Case
C is M -disentangling predicate on XU A ⊆ C ∀ψ ∈M. {X =q ψ, A} c {B}
{A} c {B}
As a special case (with C := class(x) and using Lemma 6), we can recover a rule for case
distinction over classical variables: ∀z.{X =q |z〉, class(X), A} c {B} =⇒ {class(X), A} c {B}.
See the derived rule CaseClassical on page 34 for details. Notice that we would not have been
able to even state such a case rule without using ghosts! The Case rule is proven in Lemma 14
in Section 6.3.
The Case rule has the disadvantage that we need to have a disentangling predicate in the
precondition. As described above, this is necessary because the variable under consideration
might be entangled with other variables. However, if we make a case distinction over the state of
all variables, then this requirement disappears. In fact, it turns out that it is enough to make a
case distinction over the state of the free variables in program and pre-/postconditions plus one
extra variable x (this is not obvious because those variables might still be entangled with other
variables that are not used but nevertheless present, even variables with uncountable type):
Universe
XEU ⊇ fv(A, c) X ⊇ progvars(fv(B)) x /∈ X type of x is infinite
∀ψ ∈ ℓ2[XxE], ψ′ ∈ ℓ2[U], ψ, ψ′ 6= 0. {XxE =q ψ, U =q ψ′, A} c {B}
{A} c {B}
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(We call this rule Universe since we do a case distinction over the state of all variables, i.e., of
the whole universe.) We will see an example where the Universe rule is useful in the analysis of
the quantum one-time pad (Section 8.3, general case). Note that it is important in this rule that
we can fix one concrete set XxEU of variables to quantify over. Otherwise, we would have to
quantify over all states over all possible sets of variables; depending on the precise formalization
the “set” of all possible sets of variables might not even be a set, and a rigorous formalization
of the rule may not be possible in logical foundations that do not allow us to quantify over
large classes (e.g., higher-order logic as formalized in Isabelle/HOL [17]). The rule is proven in
Lemma 16 in Section 6.3.
For stating the next rules more readably, we introduce another notation: We write A⇛ B
for {A} skip {B} (which in turn is equivalent to ∀ρ. ρ  A =⇒ ρ  B). By rules Seq and Skip
(and the fact that skip is the neutral element of ;) we immediately have that⇛ is a preorder that
refines ⊆. Also note that rule Seq implies that A⇛ A′, {A′} c {B′}, B′ ⇛ B =⇒ {A} c {B}, so
⇛ can be used for rewriting Hoare judgments.
The next three rules are specific to ghost variables and allow us to rewrite predicates.
Rename
A⇛ A{E′/E,U′/U}
Transmute
∀i. rankMi ≤ 1
∑
i
M∗i Mi = id
G either all entangled or all unentangled ghosts
G′ either all entangled or all unentangled ghosts
A⇛
∨
i
(
(Mi onG
′) · A{G′/G}
)
ShapeShift
trE proj(ψ) = trE′ proj(ψ
′) (E ∪E′) ∩ fv(A) = ∅
(XE =q ψ, A)⇛ (XE
′ =q ψ′, A)
Rule Rename simply allows us to rename ghosts, this mainly allows us to tidy up judgments.
Rule Rename follows directly from Definitions 1 and 2. When reading Transmute, recall that
G,G′ may refer to both entangled and unentangled ghosts. The purpose of the Transmute
rule is to change an entangled ghost into an unentangled ghost or vice versa. (That is, we
will usually have G = e and G′ = u or vice versa.) Ideally, we would like to have something
like A ⇛ A{u/e} =: A′ and vice versa, i.e., being able to change the kinds of ghost variables
freely. But of course, that would mean that entangled and unentangled ghosts are equivalent,
and we would not have to had to distinguish between those different kinds of variables in the
first place. Instead, we get a somewhat more complicate rule where, after replacing u by e or
vice versa, we also need to replace A′ by
∨
i
(
(Mi onG
′) · A′
)
. (Recall that ∨ is the disjunction
of predicates, i.e., the sum of subspaces, see page 5. Hence
∨
i is a disjunction of a family of
predicates (Mi onG
′)·A′.) The rule will be most useful if we can chose theMi in such a way that∨
i
(
(Mi onG
′) · A′
)
= A′. We will see later that this is often possible when classical variables are
involved (i.e., when the precondition contains class(X)).
An example of using rule Transmute analyzes the predicate distrib(X, D):
distrib(X, D) = (Xe =q ψDD)⇛
∨
i(proj(|i〉)onu) · (Xu =q ψDD)
=
∨
i
(
Xu =q
√
D(i) |i〉 ⊗ |i〉
)
⊆
{
(X ≡q u) = separable(X)
(X ≡cl u) = class(X).
Here rule Transmute is applied with Mi := proj(|i〉), G := e, G
′ := u. Thus distrib(X, D)
implies that X is separable and classical.
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The main purpose of ShapeShift, in contrast, is to rewrite the state ψ in predicates of the
form XE =q ψ. The ShapeShift rule has the precondition trE proj(ψ) = trE′ proj(ψ
′). That
is, after tracing out (erasing) E,E′, the two states ψ, ψ′ (interpreted as density operators by
applying proj(·)) should be identical. Or, stated differently, looking only at X, ψ and ψ′ have to
look identical. Thus the rule says, roughly, that in a predicate XE =q ψ, we can replace ψ by
any state that looks identical from the point of view of X. For example, xe =q |00〉 + |11〉 ⇛
xe =q |01〉+ |10〉.
Both Transmute and ShapeShift are be extensively used in the derivations of derived rules
in Section 7.1. We refer to those derivations for examples as to how and where Transmute and
ShapeShift can be used. ShapeShift is also used as the core step in the security proof of the
quantum one-time pad (Section 8.3). The rules are proven in Lemmas 17 and 18, respectively.
6.3 Proofs of core rules
We begin with some auxiliary lemmas:
Lemma 7 Let ρ be a mixed memory over VW and A a predicate over V. Then supp ρ ⊆
A⊗ ℓ2(W) iff supp trW ρ ⊆ A.
Proof. For a predicate B, let PB denote the projector onto B. Then for a mixed memory σ =∑
i proj(ψi), suppσ ⊆ B iff ∀i. ψi ∈ B iff ∀i. ‖PBψi‖ = ‖ψi‖ iff ∀i. trPBproj(ψi)P
∗
B = tr proj(ψi)
iff trPBσP
∗
B = trσ. (The last step uses that trPBproj(ψi)P
∗
B ≤ tr proj(ψi) for all i.)
We have
trPA⊗ℓ2[W]ρP
∗
A⊗ℓ2[W] = tr(PA ⊗ idW)ρ(PA ⊗ idW)
∗
= tr trW(PA ⊗ idW)ρ(PA ⊗ idW)
∗ = trPA(trW ρ)PA∗
Thus supp ρ ⊆ A⊗ ℓ2(W) iff supp trW ρ ⊆ A. 
Lemma 8 If A is a predicate, and ρi are a family of mixed memories with ρi  A for all i, and∑
i ρi exists, then
∑
i ρi  A.
Proof. A is a predicate over XEU, and ρi are mixed memories over X for some XEU. Since
ρi  A, there are (XE,U)-separable ρ
◦
i with supp ρ
◦
i ⊆ A and trEU ρ
◦
i = ρi. We have
∑
tr ρ◦i =∑
tr ρi <∞, since
∑
ρi exists. Thus ρˆ
◦ :=
∑
ρ◦i exists.
Then trEU ρˆ
◦ =
∑
trEU ρ
◦
i =
∑
ρi. And since all ρ
◦
i are (XE,U)-separable, so is ρˆ
◦. Finally,
supp ρˆ◦ = supp
∑
ρ◦i =
∑
supp ρ◦i ⊆ A. Thus
∑
ρi  A, as desired. 
Lemma 9 Let ρ be a mixed memory over X, let A be a predicate, and assume ρ  A.
(i) Let M be an operator from ℓ2[X] to ℓ2[X′]. Then MρM∗  (M onX) · A.
(ii) Let Y ⊆ X and fv(A) ∩ Y = ∅ and N be an operator from from ℓ2[Y] to ℓ2[Y′]. Then
(N onY)ρ(N onY)∗  A.
Proof. We first prove (i). Let E(σ) := MσM∗ for all σ. Then ρ′ := E(ρ) is a mixed memory over
X′, and we need to show ρ′  (M onX) · A. And in the judgment ρ  A, A is a predicate over
some variables XEU for some variables EU, and in the judgment ρ′  M · A, it is interpreted
as a predicate over variables X′EU (see page 7).
Since ρ  A, there exists a (XE,U)-separable ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and trEU ρ◦ = ρ. Let
20
ρ˜◦ := (E ⊗ idEU)(ρ◦). Then ρ˜◦ is (X′E,U)-separable. Furthermore,
trEU ρ˜
◦ = (idX ⊗ tr) ◦ (E ⊗ idEU)(ρ◦) = (E ⊗ tr)(ρ◦) = E(trEU ρ◦) = E(ρ) = ρ′.
(Here tr is seen as a superoperator from the trace-class operators over EU to the trace-class
operators on the 1-dimensional space C.)
And finally, we can write ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψi) for some ψi ∈ ℓ
2[XEU] and thus
supp ρ˜◦ = supp (E ⊗ idEU)(ρ◦) = supp (M onX)ρ◦(M onX)∗
= supp
∑
i
proj
(
(M onX)ψi
)
= span{(M onX)ψi}i = (M onX) · span{ψi}i
= (M onX) · supp ρ◦ ⊆ (M onX) · A
Thus ρ′  (M onX) · A. This shows (i).
We now show (ii) by reduction to (i). Let M := (N onY). Then by (i),
(N onY)ρ(N onY)∗ = MρM∗  (M onX) · A. Thus we need to show that (M onX) · A ⊆ A.
Fix ψ ∈ (M onX) · A. Then there exists ψ′ ∈ A with ψ = (M onX) · ψ′. A is a predicate
on XEU for some EU. Let P be the projector onto A. Since fv(A) ∩ Y = ∅, we can write
P = idY ⊗P
′ for some projector P ′ on XEU \Y. And when A is interpreted as a predicate on
XEU \Y ∪Y′ (as, e.g., in the judgment (N onY)ρ(N onY)∗  A), then the projector onto A
is idY′ ⊗ P
′. We have
(idY′ ⊗ P
′)ψ = P (N ⊗ ℓ2[XEU \Y])ψ′ = (idY′ ⊗ P ′)(N ⊗ ℓ2[XEU \Y])ψ′
= (N ⊗ P ′)ψ′ = (M onX)(idY ⊗ P ′)ψ′ = (M onX)Pψ′
(∗)
= (M onX)ψ′ = ψ.
Here (∗) follows since ψ′ is in A, the image of the projector P . Thus (idY′ ⊗ P ′)ψ = ψ, hence
ψ is in the image of idY′ ⊗ P , hence ψ ∈ A.
Since this holds for all ψ ∈ (M onX) · A, this implies (M onX) · A ⊆ A. With
(N onY)ρ(N onY)∗  (M onX) · A, we get (N onY)ρ(N onY)∗  A. This shows (ii). 
Lemma 10 Rule Apply is sound.
Proof. The predicate A is a space of quantum memories over some variables XallEU with
X ⊆ Xall. In this proof, we will encounter both the term U onX interpreted as an operator on
quantum memories overXall, and overXallEU. Since the syntax U onX does not disambiguate
between the two (the space we are operating on is left implicit), we write (U onX)Xall and
(U onX)XallEU, respectively. Note that (U onX)XallEU = (U onX)Xall ⊗ idEU.
We need to show that for any mixed memory ρ over X, ρ  A implies Japply U to XK(ρ) 
(U onX)XallEU ·A. Since ρ  A, there exists an (X
allE,U)-separable ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and
trEU ρ
◦ = ρ. Since ρ◦ is (XallE,U)-separable, we can write it as ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψXallE,i ⊗ ψU,i).
Since supp ρ◦ ⊆ A, this implies that ψXallE,i ⊗ ψU,i ∈ A for all i.
Let
ρˆ◦ :=
∑
i
proj
((
(U onX)XallE ψXallE,i
)
⊗ ψU,i
)
.
Then ρˆ◦ is (XallE,U)-separable. And(
(U onX)XallE ψXallE,i
)
⊗ ψU,i = (U onX)XallEU(ψXallE,i ⊗ ψU,i) ∈ (U onX)XallEU · A.
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So supp ρˆ◦ ∈ (U onX)XallEU · A. Finally,
trEU ρˆ
◦ = (U onX)Xall
(
trEU
∑
i
proj(ψXallE,i ⊗ ψU,i)
)
(U onX)∗Xall
= (U onX)Xall(trEU ρ
◦)(U onX)∗Xall = (U onX)Xallρ(U onX)
∗
Xall = Japply U to XK(ρ).
Hence Japply U to XK(ρ)  (U onX)XallEU · A. 
Lemma 11 Rule Init is sound.
Proof. A is a predicate on some variables XallEU. We also have that e /∈ E and that
e and x have the same type because otherwise A{e/x} would not be well-typed. Let B :=
(A{e/x}, x =q |0〉) (the postcondition). Note that there is an implicit conversion happening:
By definition, A{e/x} is a predicate on XallEeU \ x, so it does not make sense to intersect it
(∧) with x =q |0〉. But, as discussed at the end of Section 2 (page 7), we identify any predicate
A′ with A′ ⊗ ℓ2[x]. In particular, A{e/x} is identified with A{e/x} ⊗ ℓ2[x] =: A{e/x}XallEeU
on XallEeU. In that notation, B is actually B = (A{e/x}XallEeU, x =q |0〉), a predicate over
XallEeU.
To show the rule, we need to show that for any mixed memory ρ onXall, ρ  A implies ρ  B.
ρ  A implies that there is a (XallE,U)-separable ρ◦ such that supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and trEU ρ◦ = ρ.
Let E be the canonical mapping from mixed memories over x to mixed memories over e.
(Formally, E(σ) = Ux→eσU∗x→e where Ux→e was defined on page 6.) Then E ⊗ idXallEU\x maps
mixed memories over XallEU to mixed memories over XallEeU \ x by renaming x to e. We
define:
ρˆ◦ := (E ⊗ idXallEU\x)(ρ
◦) and ρ˜◦ := ρˆ◦ ⊗ proj(|0〉x).
Since ρ◦ is (XallE,U)-separable, and E ⊗ idXallEU\x is the identity on U, we have that ρˆ◦ is
(XallEe \ x,U)-separable, and thus ρ˜◦ is (XallEe,U)-separable.
We have
supp ρˆ◦ = supp(Ux→e ⊗ idXallEU\x)ρ
◦(Ux→e ⊗ idXallEU\x)
∗
= (Ux→e ⊗ idXallEU\x) · supp ρ
◦ ⊆ (Ux→e ⊗ idXallEU\x) · A
(∗)
= A{x/e}.
Here (∗) is the definition of A{x/e} (page 6). Thus
supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ supp ρˆ◦ ⊗ ℓ2[x] ⊆ A{x/e} ⊗ ℓ2[x] = A{e/x}XallEeU.
And supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ (x =q |0〉) by definition of ρ˜◦. Thus supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ B. Finally,
trEeU ρ˜
◦ = (trEeU ρˆ◦)⊗ proj(|0〉x)
(∗)
= (trExU ρ
◦)⊗ proj(|0〉x)
= (trx trEU ρ
◦)⊗ proj(|0〉x) = (trx ρ)⊗ proj(|0〉x) = Jinit xK(ρ).
Here (∗) uses that ρˆ◦ is the result of renaming x to e in ρ◦, so tracing out e in ρˆ◦ is the same
as tracing out x in ρ◦.
Altogether, we have Jinit xK(ρ)  B. 
Lemma 12 Rule If is sound.
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Proof. The predicate A is a space of quantum memories over some variables XallEU. The
predicate B is a space of quantum memories over some variables XallE′U′.
We need to show that for any mixed memory ρ on Xall, if ρ  A, then
Jif x then c else dK(ρ)  B. Recall that Jif x then c else dK(ρ) = JcK(ρ1) + JdK(ρ0) where
ρi := ↓i(ρ) = (proj(|i〉)onx)ρ(proj(|i〉)onx)
∗.
By Lemma 9, we have ρi = (proj(|i〉)onx)ρ(proj(|i〉)onx)
∗  (proj(|i〉)onx) · A. Since{
(proj(|1〉)onx) · A
}
c
{
B
}
and
{
(proj(|0〉)onx) · A
}
d
{
B
}
by assumption of the If rule, it
follows that JcK(ρ1)  B and JdK(ρ0)  B. Thus with Lemma 8, Jif x then c else dK(ρ) =
JcK(ρ1) + JdK(ρ0)  B. 
Lemma 13 Rule While is sound.
Proof. The predicate A is a subspace of quantum memories over XallEU for some EU.
We need to show that for any mixed memory ρ on Xall, if ρ  A, then Jwhile x do cK(ρ) 
(proj(|0〉)onx) ·A. Recall that Jwhile y do cK(ρ) =
∑∞
n=0 ↓0(ρn) with ρn := JcK(↓1(ρn−1)) and
ρ0 := ρ, where ↓1, ↓0 are defined by ↓i(σ) := (proj(|i〉)onx)σ(proj(|i〉)onx)
∗.
We show ρn  A for n ≥ 0 by induction. The base case follows since ρ0 = ρ  A. For
the induction step, assume that ρn  A. Then ↓1(ρn) = (proj(|1〉)onx)ρn(proj(|1〉)onx)
∗ 
(proj(|1〉)onx) · A by Lemma 9 (i). From the premise of the While rule, it then follows that
ρn+1 = JcK
(
↓1(ρn)
)
 A.
Since ρn  A, we have ↓0(ρn)  (proj(|0〉)onx) · A (again by Lemma 9 (i)). Since this holds
for all n, with Lemma 8 we have that Jwhile y do cK(ρ) =
∑∞
n=0 ↓0(ρn)  (proj(|0〉)onx) · A.

Lemma 14 Rule Case is sound.
Proof. The predicate A is a subspace of quantum memories over XallEU˜ for some variables
EU˜ with U ⊆ U˜. And B is a subspace of quantum memories over XallE′U′ for some variables
E′U′.
We need to show that if ρ  A then JcK(ρ)  B. Since ρ  A, there is a (XallE, U˜)-separable
ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and trEU˜ ρ
◦ = ρ. For making the notation more compact in the remainder
of the proof, let V := XallE\X and W := U˜\U. In that notation, ρ◦ is (XV,UW)-separable.
Thus ρ◦ can be written as ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψall ,i) where ψall ,i := ψXV,i⊗ψUW,i for some quantum
memories ψXV,i 6= 0 over XV and ψUW,i 6= 0 over UW.
Fix some i. (We will omit i from the subscripts for now.) We can write ψUW 6= 0 as a
nonempty sum ψUW =
∑
j φU,j ⊗ φW,j with quantum memories φU,j , φW,j 6= 0 over U and
W respectively where the φW,j are orthogonal. We have ψall ∈ supp ρ
◦ ⊆ A ⊆ C. Thus
ψXV ⊗ φU,j ⊗ φW,j = (proj(φW,j)onW)ψall ∈ (proj(φW,j)onW) · C
(∗)
⊆ C.
Here (∗) follows from fv(C) ∩W = ∅. Hence ψXV ⊗ φU,j ∈ C for all j. (Note here that the
notation C is overloaded both as a predicate over XVUW and over XVU, see page 7.) Thus
ψXV ⊗ φU,j∗ ∈ C for some j
∗. (Recall that the sum ψUW =
∑
j φU,j ⊗ φW,j was nonempty.)
Since C is M -disentangling, this implies that ψXV = ψX ⊗ ψV for some ψV ∈ ℓ
2[V] and
ψX ∈ M . Thus ψall = ψX ⊗ ψV ⊗ ψUW ∈ (X =q ψX). Since also ψall ∈ A, we have
that supp proj(ψall ) ⊆ (X =q ψX, A). And since XV = X
allE and UW = U˜, proj(ψall ) is
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(XallE, U˜)-separable. Hence ρall := trEU˜ proj(ψall )  (X =q ψX) ∧ A. By assumption of the
rule Case, {X =q ψX, A} c {B} (since ψX ∈M). Thus JcK(ρall )  B.
We now “unfix” i. We thus have JcK(ρall ,i)  B for ρall ,i := trEU˜ proj(ψall ,i). Furthermore,
JcK(ρ) = JcK(trEU˜ ρ
◦) = JcK
(
trEU˜
∑
i
proj(ψall ,i)
)
= JcK
(∑
i
ρall ,i
)
=
∑
i
JcK(ρall ,i).
By Lemma 8, ∀i. JcK(ρall ,i)  B implies JcK(ρ) =
∑
iJcK(ρall ,i)  B. 
The following is an auxiliary lemma needed for the proof of rule Universe. But it is also of
independent interest because it says that the choice of the set of program variables with respect
to which we evaluate a program (denoted Xall on page 7) does not matter as long as it is large
enough.
Lemma 15 (Changing the set of program variables) Let {A} c {B}X denote Hoare judg-
ments {A} c {B} as in Definition 2, except that the set X is used instead of Xall. (I.e., the
semantics of the program c are defined with respect to memories containing variables X, not
Xall.)
Assume that fv(c), progvars(fv(A)), progvars(fv(B)) ⊆ X1,X2. Let Yi := Xi\fv(c)\fv(A)\fv(B).
Let Ti be the type of Yi. Assume that |T1| ≥ |T2| or T1 is infinite. Then {A} c {B}
X1 =⇒
{A} c {B}X2 .
Proof. We fix some E,U such that EU contains all ghosts from fv(A), fv(B). By Lemma 1, we
can interpret A,B in judgments ρ  A, ρ  B as predicates over XEU (where ρ is over X), i.e.,
we can without loss of generality use the same EU everywhere. Note that X1 \Y1 = X2 \Y2
since both are equal to fv(c) ∪ progvars(fv(A)) ∪ progvars(fv(B)).
Assume {A} c {B}X1 . To show {A} c {B}X2 , we fix a mixed memory ρ over X2 with ρ  A,
and we need to show JcK(ρ)  B.
Let S := supp trX2\Y2 ρ ⊆ ℓ
2[Y2]. The operator trX2\Y2 ρ can be written as
∑
i∈I piproj(ψi)
with some orthonormal ψi ∈ ℓ
2[Y2] and some pi > 0 with
∑
i∈I pi = tr(trX2\Y2 ρ) <∞. Thus
I is countable (otherwise
∑
i∈I pi cannot converge). Hence dimS = dim span{ψi}i∈I = |I| is
countable. Furthermore dimS ≤ dim ℓ2[Y2] = |T2|. Since |T1| ≥ |T2| or |T1| is infinite, it follows
that dimS ≤ |T1| = dim ℓ
2[Y1]. Thus there exists an isometry U from S to ℓ
2[Y1]. We extend
U to an operator from ℓ2[Y2] to ℓ
2[Y1] by setting U = 0 on the orthogonal complement of S.
Then U∗U is the projector PS onto S. Since S = supp trX2\Y2 ρ, S ⊗ ℓ
2[X2 \Y2] ⊇ supp ρ.
And (PS onY2) is the projector onto S ⊗ ℓ
2[X2 \Y2]. Hence supp ρ is fixed by (PS onY2).
Let E(σ) := UσU∗ for all σ over Y2. And let Eˆ(σ) := (U onY2)σ(U onY2)∗ for all σ
over X2, i.e., Eˆ = idX2\Y2 ⊗ E . Let E
∗(σ) := U∗σU for all σ over Y1. And let Eˆ∗(σ) :=
(U∗ onY1)σ(U∗ onY1)∗ for all σ over X1, i.e., Eˆ∗ = idX1\Y1 ⊗ E
∗. We have Eˆ∗ ◦ Eˆ(ρ) =
(U∗U onY2)ρ(U∗U onY2)∗ = (PS onY2)ρ(PS onY2)∗ = ρ. Here the last equality is because
supp ρ is fixed by (PS onY2).
Since fv(A) ∩ Y2 = ∅ and ρ  A, by Lemma 9 (ii), Eˆ(ρ)  A. Note that Eˆ(ρ) is a mixed
memory over X2 \Y2 ·∪ Y1 = X1. Since {A} c {B}
X1 , we have JcKX1
(
Eˆ(ρ)
)
 B. Here JcKX1
denotes the semantics JcK of c defined with respect to the set of variablesX1 instead ofX
all. Note
that JcKX1 = JcKX1\Y1 ⊗ idY1 and JcK
X2 = JcKX2\Y2 ⊗ idY2 (since fv(c) ∩Y1 = fv(c) ∩Y2 = ∅).
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Then
Eˆ∗
(
JcKX1
(
Eˆ(ρ)
))
= (idX1\Y1 ⊗ E
∗) ◦ (JcKX1\Y1 ⊗ idY1) ◦ (idX2\Y2 ⊗ E)(ρ)
(∗)
=
(
JcKX2\Y2 ⊗ (E∗ ◦ E)
)
(ρ) =
(
JcKX2\Y2 ⊗ idY2
)
◦
(
idX2\Y2 ⊗ (E
∗ ◦ E)
)
(ρ)
=
(
JcKX2\Y2 ⊗ idY2
)
◦ (Eˆ∗ ◦ Eˆ)(ρ)
(∗∗)
=
(
JcKX2\Y2 ⊗ idY2
)
(ρ) = JcKX2 (ρ). (2)
In (∗) we use that X1 \Y1 = X2 \Y2. And (∗∗) follows since Eˆ
∗ ◦ Eˆ(ρ) = ρ (shown above).
Since fv(B) ∩Y1 = ∅ and JcKX1
(
Eˆ(ρ)
)
 B, by Lemma 9 (ii), Eˆ∗
(
JcKX1(Eˆ(ρ))
)
 B. By (2),
this implies JcKX2(ρ)  B. Since ρ was an arbitrary mixed memory over X2 with ρ  A, this
implies {A} c {B}X2 . 
Lemma 16 Rule Universe is sound.
Most of the work for the proof has already been done in Lemma 15.
Proof. By Lemma 15 (with X1 := Xx and X2 := X
all), we have that {A} c {B}Xx (in the
notation of Lemma 15) implies {A} c {B}. (For this, note that Xx\ fv(c)\ fv(A)\ fv(B) contains
x and thus has infinite type.) Thus to prove the soundness of Universe, it is sufficient to prove
{A} c {B}Xx.
To show {A} c {B}Xx, fix some ρ over Xx with ρ  A. Then there is a (XxE,U)-separable
ρ◦ over XxEU with trEU ρ◦ = ρ and supp ρ◦ ⊆ A.
Since ρ◦ is (XxE,U)-separable, we can write ρ◦ =
∑
i proj(ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i) with ψi ∈ ℓ
2[XxE]
and ψ′i ∈ ℓ
2[U] and ψi, ψ
′
i 6= 0. Since supp ρ
◦ ⊆ A, we have ψi ⊗ ψ′i ∈ A for all i. Fur-
thermore, we have ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i ∈ (XxE =q ψi) and ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i ∈ (U =q ψ
′
i). Thus ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i ∈
Ai := (XxE =q ψi, U =q ψ
′
i, A). We then have that proj(ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i) is (XxE,U)-separable
and supp proj(ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i) ⊆ Ai. Thus ρi := trEU proj(ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i)  Ai. By assumption of
the rule Universe we have {Ai} c {B}. By Lemma 15 (with X1 := X
all and X2 := Xx),
{Ai} c {B}
Xx. (For this, note that Xx ⊆ Xall since otherwise {XxE =q ψ, U =q ψ
′, A} c {B}
in the rule’s premise would not be well-defined. Hence the cardinality of the type of
Xall \ fv(c,A,B) is at least as big as that of Xx \ fv(c,A,B).) Since ρi  Ai, we have JcK(ρi)  B.
This holds for all i.
We have ρ = trEU ρ
◦ =
∑
i trEU proj(ψi ⊗ ψ
′
i) =
∑
i ρi. Thus JcK(ρ) =
∑
iJcK(ρi). Since for
all i, JcK(ρi)  B, by Lemma 8 we have JcK(ρ) =
∑
iJcK(ρi)  B. Since this holds for all ρ over
Xx with ρ  A, we have shown {A} c {B}Xx. As mentioned in the beginning of the proof, by
Lemma 15 this implies {A} c {B}. 
Lemma 17 Rule Transmute is sound.
Proof. We distinguish four cases: G,G′ are entangled ghosts (EE-case), G,G′ are unentangled
ghosts (UU-case), G are entangled and G′ are unentangled ghosts (EU-case), and G are unen-
tangled and G′ are entangled ghosts (UE-case). Most of the proof is the same in all four cases,
we make case distinctions in individual proof steps as necessary.
A is a predicate over XallEU for some E,U. And A′ := A{G/G′} is a predicate over
XallE′U′ for some E′,U′. (What variables are in E′ and U′, respectively, depends on the case.
E.g., in the EU-case, E′ = E \G and U′ = U ·∪G.)
To show A⇛
∨
i
(
(Mi onG
′) · A{G′/G}
)
=: B, we fix some mixed memory ρ over Xall with
ρ  A. We have to show that ρ  B.
Since ρ  A, there exists a (XallE,U)-separable ρ◦ over XallEU with supp ρ◦ ⊆ A and
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trEU ρ
◦ = ρ.
Let ρ˜◦ := UG→G′ρ◦U∗G→G′ . We have that supp ρ˜
◦ = UG→G′ · supp ρ◦ ⊆ UG→G′ · A =
A{G′/G} = A′.
In the EE- and EU-case, G ⊆ E. That is, UG→G′ renames only variables in E. Then since
ρ◦ is (XallE,U)-separable, ρ˜◦ is (XallE \G ·∪G′,U)-separable in that case. Similarly, in the
UE- and UU-case, ρ˜◦ is then (XallE,U \G ·∪G′)-separable.
And since G ∩Xall = ∅, we have trE′U′ ρ˜◦ = trEU ρ◦ = ρ.
Note that this does not imply that ρ  A′ because ρ˜◦ is not necessarily (XallE′,U′)-separable.
(The separability is along the wrong variables, at least in the EU- and UE-cases.)
Let ρ◦i := (Mi onG
′)ρ˜◦(Mi onG′)∗ and ρi := trE′U′ ρ◦i . Then supp ρ
◦
i = (Mi onG
′) ·
supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ (Mi onG′) · A′ ⊆ B.
We show that ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-separable by distinguishing four cases: In the EE-case, ρ˜◦
is (XallE \G ·∪G′,U)-separable. And (Mi onG′) operates only on XallE \G ·∪G′, hence ρ◦i
is also (XallE \G ·∪G′,U)-separable. And E′ = E \G ·∪G′, U′ = U, hence ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-
separable. In the UU-case, ρ˜◦ is (XallE,U \G ·∪G′)-separable. And (Mi onG′) operates only
on U \G ·∪G′, hence ρ◦i is also (X
allE,U \G ·∪G′)-separable. And E′ = E, U′ = U \G ·∪G′,
hence ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-separable.
In the EU-case, ρ˜◦ is (XallE \ G ·∪ G′,U)-separable. Thus we can write ρ˜◦ as ρ˜◦ =∑
j proj(ψXallE\G ·∪G′ ⊗ ψU) for some ψXallE\G ·∪G′ ∈ ℓ
2[XallE \G ·∪G′] and ψU ∈ ℓ2[U]. Then
ρ◦i =
∑
j proj(ψ
′
XallE\G ·∪G′,j ⊗ ψU,j) with ψ
′
XallE\G ·∪G′,j := (Mi onG
′)ψXallE\G ·∪G′,j . SinceMi
has rank ≤ 1, imMi = span{ψ
′
G′} for some ψ
′
G′ ∈ ℓ
2[G′] (in the case rankMi = 0, we simply
use ψ′G′ = 0). Thus ψ
′
XallE\G ·∪G′,j = ψ
′
XallE\G,j ⊗ ψ
′
G′ for some ψ
′
XallE\G,j ∈ ℓ
2[XallE \G].
Hence ρ◦i =
∑
j proj
(
ψ′
XallE\G,j ⊗ (ψ
′
G′ ⊗ ψU,j)
)
, thus ρ◦i is (X
allE \G,UG′)-separable. Since
in the EU-case, E′ = E \G and U′ = UG′, we have that ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-separable.
In the UE-case, we show that ρ◦i =
∑
j proj
(
(ψXallE,j ⊗ ψ
′
G′)⊗ ψ
′
U\G,j
)
for some ψXallE,j ∈
ℓ2[XallE], ψ′G′ ∈ ℓ
2[G′], and ψ′
U\G,j ∈ ℓ
2[U \G, j] (analogous to the EU-case). Thus ρ◦i is
(XallEG′,U \G)-separable. Since in the UE-case, E′ = EG′ and U′ = U \G, we have that
ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-separable.
Thus in all four cases, ρ◦i is (X
allE′,U′)-separable. Furthermore, we showed above that
supp ρ◦i ⊆ B, and defined ρi := trE′U′ ρ
◦
i . Thus ρi  B.
Let E(σ) :=
∑
i(Mi onG
′)σ(Mi onG′)∗. Since
∑
iM
∗
i Mi = id, E is trace-preserving.∑
i ρi =
∑
i trE′U′ ρ
◦
i =
∑
i trE′U′(Mi onG
′)ρ˜◦(Mi onG′)∗ = trE′U′ E(ρ˜◦). Since E is trace-
preserving and operates only on G′ ⊆ E′U′, we have trE′U′ E(ρ˜◦) = trE′U′ ρ˜◦ = ρ. Thus∑
i ρi = ρ. By Lemma 8, ρi  B then implies ρ  B.
Since this holds for all ρ  A, we have A⇛ B. 
Lemma 18 Rule ShapeShift is sound.
Proof. Since (E∪E′)∩ fv(A) = ∅, we can interpret A as a predicate over XallE˜U˜ for some E˜U˜
with E˜∩ (E∪E′) = ∅. (See the discussion on page 7 about identifying predicates over different
sets.) Then the pre- and postconditions (XE =q ψ, A) and (XE
′ =q ψ′, A) can be written more
explicitly as predicates (XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E]) and (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]) over XallE˜EU˜ and
XallE˜E′U˜, respectively. (Justified by Lemma 1.) And ψ, ψ′ are quantum memories over XE
and XE′, respectively.
Fix a mixed memory ρ overXall with ρ  (XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E]). To show rule ShapeShift,
we need to show that ρ  (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]).
Since ρ  (XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E]), there is an (XallE˜E, U˜)-separable ρ◦ with supp ρ◦ ⊆
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(XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E]) and trE˜EU˜ ρ
◦ = ρ.
Thus supp ρ◦ ⊆ (XE =q ψ). Hence ρ◦ = (trXE ρ◦)⊗proj(ψ). Let ρ˜◦ := (trXE ρ◦)⊗proj(ψ′).
Then
trE ρ
◦ = trE
(
(trXE ρ
◦)⊗ proj(ψ)
)
= (trXE ρ
◦)⊗ trE proj(ψ)
(∗)
= (trXE ρ
◦)⊗ trE′ proj(ψ′) = trE′
(
(trXE ρ
◦)⊗ proj(ψ)
)
= trE′ ρ˜
◦. (3)
Here (∗) is by assumption from rule ShapeShift. Then
trE˜E′U˜ ρ˜
◦ = trE˜U˜ trE′ ρ˜
◦ (3)= trE˜U˜ trE ρ
◦ = trE˜EU˜ ρ
◦ = ρ.
Since ρ◦ is (XallE˜E, U˜)-separable, trXE ρ◦ is (XallE˜ \ X, U˜)-separable, and hence ρ˜◦ =
(trXE ρ
◦)⊗ proj(ψ′) is (XallE˜ \X ·∪XE′, U˜) = (XallE˜E′, U˜)-separable.
Since supp ρ◦ ⊆ (XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ2[E]), we have supp ρ◦ ⊆ A⊗ ℓ2[E]. By Lemma 7, this
implies supp trE ρ
◦ ⊆ A. Then by (3), supp trE′ ρ˜◦ ⊆ A. And by Lemma 7, supp ρ˜◦ ⊆
A⊗ ℓ2[E′]. And since ρ˜◦ = (trXE ρ◦) ⊗ proj(ψ′), we also have supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ (XE′ = ψ′). Thus
supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]).
Since ρ˜◦ is (XallE˜E′, U˜)-separable and satisfies supp ρ˜◦ ⊆ (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]) and
trE˜E′U˜ ρ˜
◦ = ρ, it follows that ρ  (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]).
Since ρ was arbitrary with ρ  (XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E]), we have shown
(XE =q ψ, A⊗ ℓ
2[E])⇛ (XE′ =q ψ′, A⊗ ℓ2[E′]), the conclusion of the rule. 
7 Derived rules
In this section, we show that our eleven core rules are powerful enough to derive a number of new
rules without having to refer to the semantics of Hoare judgments with ghosts from Definition 2.
(That is, the rules in this section would hold for any definition of Hoare judgments satisfying the
eleven core rules.)
This first derived rule is relatively trivial but of high importance:
Conseq
A ⊆ A′ {A′} c {B′}B′ ⊆ B
{A} c {B}
Proof. From Skip and Seq, we get {A} skip; c; skip {B}. Since skip is the neutral element for ;
(page 7), this implies {A} c {B}. 
7.1 Derived rules for derived language elements
Initialization. The next rules deal with the initialization of variables. They are generalizations
of rule Init, dealing with the syntactic sugar X
q
← ψ (initialization) and X ← z (classical
initialization).
InitQ{
A
}
X
q
← ψ
{
A{e/X}, X =q ψ
} InitC{
A
}
X← z
{
A{e/X}, X =q |z〉, class(X)
}
The derivation of rule InitQ is not difficult, but the proof of rule InitQ provides a nice first
example of reasoning with sequences of Hoare judgments. The derivation of rule InitC is a little
more involved, and it gives an example how to use rules ShapeShift and Transmute to show
that the content of a variable is classical.
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Proof of InitQ. X
q
← ψ is syntactic sugar for init x1; . . . ; init xn; apply Uψ to X where
Uψ|0, . . . , 0〉 = ψ and x1 . . .xn := X. For variables E := e1 . . .en and e of the same type as X,
we have:{
A
}
init x1
{
A{e1/x1}, x1 =q |0〉
}
(rule Init)
init x2
{
A{e1e2/x1x2}, x1 =q |0〉, x2 =q |0〉
}
(rule Init)
. . .
{
A{e1 . . . en−1/x1 . . .xn−1}, x1 =q |0〉, . . . ,xn−1 =q |0〉
}
init xn
{
A{E/X}, X =q |0〉
}
(rule Init)
apply Uψ to X
{
(Uψ onX) · (A{E/X}, X =q |0〉)
}
(rule Apply)
=
{
A{E/X}, X =q ψ
}
⇛
{
A{e/X}, X =q ψ
}
(rule Rename)
Then by rule Seq, we get {A}X
q
← ψ {A{e/X}, X =q ψ}. 
Proof of rule InitC. Recall that X← z is syntactic sugar for X
q
← |z〉. Thus we have{
A
}
X← z
{
A{e/X}, X =q |z〉
}
(rule InitQ)
⇛
{
A{e/X}, Xe′ =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉
}
(rule ShapeShift with E := ∅, E′ := e′)
⇛
{∨
i
(
(proj(i)onu) · (A{e/X}, Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉)
)}
(rule Transmute with Mi := proj(i), G := e
′, G′ := u)
(∗)
=
{
A{e/X}, Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉
} (∗∗)
=
{
A{e/X}, Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉, X ≡cl u
}
⊆
{
A{e/X}, X =q |z〉, X ≡cl u
}
=
{
A{e/X}, X =q |z〉, class(X)
}
Here (∗) follows since (proj(i)onu) ·
(
A{e/X}, Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉
)
=
(
A{e/X}, Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉
)
for i = z and = 0 otherwise. And (∗∗) follows since (Xu =q |z〉 ⊗ |z〉) ⊆ (X ≡cl u).
By rules Seq and Conseq, it follows that
{
A
}
X← z
{
A{e/X}, X =q |z〉, class(X)
}
. 
Measurements. More interesting is the rule for measurements because it actively makes use
of ghosts to record the distribution of outcomes. We first look at the rule for measurements that
forget the outcome (measure X instead of Y ← measure X) because it is a bit simpler, and
the underlying ideas a the same:
MeasureForget{
A
}
measure X
{
Ucopy,X→e · A
}
Here Ucopy,V→W is the isometry from V to VW defined by Ucopy,V→W |i〉V = |i〉V⊗|i〉W. Thus
Ucopy,X→e is the operation that “classically copies” (in the computational basis) the content of
X to the fresh entangled ghost e. (We have e /∈ fv(A) is fresh because otherwise Ucopy,X→e · A
would not be well-defined since it would contain two e’s.)
In other words, rule MeasureForget says that after measuring X, the result is simply to
get X entangled with a fresh entangled ghost e. Since e is a ghost, being entangled with it
effectively means that X has been measured. (It is a well-known fact in quantum information
that entangling with a subsystem that is not observed any more effectively measures a state.)
Thus, the predicate Ucopy,X→e ·A encodes the fact that X has been measured. At the same time,
this predicate does not forget about the probabilities of the different measurement outcomes.
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This is best illustrated by an example: Let x be of type integer and ψ :=
√
2/3|1〉 +
√
1/3|2〉.
We have {x =q ψ}measure x {Ucopy,x→e · (x =q ψ)} = {xe =q Ucopy,x→eψ} = {xe =q ψ′} with
ψ′ :=
√
2/3|11〉+
√
1/3|22〉. As we see, the postcondition encodes the probabilities of measuring
1 and 2 (namely, 2/3 and 1/3). Note that the postcondition xe =q ψ
′ does not mean that x is
actually entangled with something. Since e is a ghost, it only means that x is in a state that can
be seen as a hypothetical entanglement with some e. In fact, it is easy to see (Lemma 2) that
the only mixed memory on x satifying xe =q ψ
′ is ρ = 23proj(|1〉)+
1
3proj(|2〉), as expected. Thus
the postcondition faithfully encodes the probabilities of the measurement outcome, something
that would not have been possible without using ghosts.
Since measurements are merely syntactic sugar in our language, it turns out that
rule MeasureForget can be easily derived from the more basic rules we saw so far:
Proof of MeasureForget. Recall from page 8 that measure X is syntactic sugar for
“z
q
← |0〉; apply CNOT to Xz; z
q
← |0〉” for some fresh z (in particular, z /∈ fv(A),X). We then
have for some fresh e:{
A
}
z
q
← |0〉
{
A{e/z}, z =q |0〉
}
=
{
A, z =q |0〉
}
(rule InitQ)
apply CNOT to Xz
{
(CNOT onXz) · (A, z =q |0〉)
}
(rule Apply)
(∗)
=
{
Ucopy,X→z · A
}
z
q
← |0〉
{
Ucopy,X→e · A, z =q |0〉
}
(rule InitQ)
⊆
{
Ucopy,X→e · A
}
.
Here (∗) follows since (CNOT onXz)(ψ ⊗ |0〉) = Ucopy,X→zψ.
Then by rules Seq and Conseq, we get {A}measure X {Ucopy,X→e · A}. 
The postcondition of rule MeasureForget encodes both the distribution of outcomes, as
well as the state after the measurement. Sometimes, it may not be necessary to remember the
distribution (only which outcomes are possible). In this case we can use the following weaker
rule:
MeasureForget*{
A
}
measure X
{
class(X),
∨
i(proj(|i〉)onX) · A
}
To understand the rule, it is easiest to look at the same example as above. Recall that ψ =√
2/3|1〉+
√
1/3|2〉 and x is of type integer. Then MeasureForget* implies{
x =q ψ
}
measure x
{
class(x),
∨
i(proj(|i〉)onx) · (x =q ψ)
}
= {class(x),
∨
i x =q proj(|i〉)ψ}.
Since proj(|i〉)ψ = 0 for i /∈ {1, 2} and proj(|i〉)ψ = |i〉 up to scalar factor for i = 1, 2, we have
that
∨
i x =q proj(|i〉)ψ equals x =q |1〉 ∨ x =q |2〉. Thus{
x =q ψ
}
measure x
{
class(x), x =q |1〉 ∨ x =q |2〉
}
.
In other words, after measuring x, x will be classical and have a state |1〉 or |2〉.
Rule MeasureForget* is derived from MeasureForget by rule Transmute:
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Proof of MeasureForget*.{
A
}
measure X
{
Ucopy,X→e · A
}
(rule MeasureForget)
⇛
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onu) · (Ucopy,X→u · A)
)}
(rule Transmute with Mi := proj(|i〉), G := e, G
′ := u)
(∗)
=
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A, u =q |i〉
)}
(∗∗)
=
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A, X =q |i〉, u =q |i〉
)}
⊆
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A, X ≡cl u
)}
⊆
{
X ≡cl u,
∨
i (proj(|i〉)onX) · A
}
=
{
class(X),
∨
i (proj(|i〉)onX) · A
}
.
Here (∗) follows since (proj(|i〉)onu)Ucopy,X→uφ = (proj(|i〉)onX)φ ⊗ |i〉u for all φ. And (∗∗)
follows since (proj(|i〉)onX) · A ⊆ (X =q |i〉). 
Above, we studied measurements that forget their outcome (measure X). When we consider
measurement that remember their outcome (Y ← measure X), we get the following analogues
to MeasureForget and MeasureForget*:
Measure{
A
}
Y ←measure X
{
Ucopy,X→e′ · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}
}
Measure*{
A
}
Y ←measure X
{
class(X), class(Y),
∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉
)}
As one can see, the only differences to MeasureForget and MeasureForget* is that
the measurement is additionally written to Y (either via Ucopy,X→Y or via Y =q |i〉).
And additionally, Y is replaced by e in A if it occurs there because it is overwritten
(analogous to rule Init, rule InitQ, rule InitC). For example, with ψ and x as above,
we get {x =q ψ}y ←measure x {xye =q ψ
′′} with ψ′′ :=
√
2/3|111〉 +
√
1/3|222〉 and
{x =q ψ}y←measure x {class(x), class(y), xy =q |11〉 ∨ xy =q |22〉}. The proofs of these
rules are very similar to those of MeasureForget and MeasureForget*:
Proof of Measure. Recall from page 8 that Y ← measure X is syntactic sugar for “Y
q
←
|0〉; z
q
← |0〉; apply CNOT to XY; apply CNOT to Xz; z
q
← |0〉” for some fresh z (in particular,
z /∈ fv(A),X,Y). We then have for some fresh e, e′:{
A
}
Y
q
← |0〉
{
A{e/Y}, Y =q |0〉
}
(rule InitQ)
z
q
← |0〉
{(
A{e/Y}, Y =q |0〉
)
{e′/z}, z =q |0〉
}
(rule InitQ)
=
{
A{e/Y}, Y =q |0〉, z =q |0〉
}
(z /∈ fv(A),Y, e)
apply CNOT to XY
{
(CNOTonXY) ·
(
A{e/Y}, Y =q |0〉
)
, z =q |0〉
}
(rule Apply, z /∈ XY)
(∗)
=
{
Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}, z =q |0〉
}
apply CNOT to Xz
{
(CNOTonXz) ·
(
Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}, z =q |0〉
)}
(rule Apply)
(∗∗)
=
{
Ucopy,X→z · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}
}
z
q
← |0〉
{
Ucopy,X→e′ · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}, z =q |0〉
}
(rule InitQ)
⊆
{
Ucopy,X→e′ · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}
}
.
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Here (∗) follows since (CNOT onXY)(ψ ⊗ |0〉) = Ucopy,X→Yψ for all ψ. And (∗∗) analogously.
Then by rules Seq andConseq, we get {A}Y ←measure X {Ucopy,X→e′ · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}}.

Proof of Measure*. We first derive an auxiliary fact:(
class(X), X ≡cl Y, B
)
⇛
(
class(X), class(Y), B
)
for any B (4)
By rule Case with C := class(X), M := {|z〉} and Lemma 6 (or more simply using the
rule CaseClassical we introduce on page 34 below), (4) follows from:
(X = |z〉, class(X), X ≡cl Y, B) ⊆ (class(X), Y = |z〉, B)
(∗)
⇛ (class(X), Y = |z〉, e = |z〉, B)
(∗∗)
⇛ (class(X), Y = |z〉, u = |z〉, B)
⊆ (class(X), Y ≡cl u, B) = (class(X), class(Y), B).
Here (∗) follows from ShapeShift with X := E := ∅, E′ := e, ψ := 1, ψ′ := |z〉e. And (∗∗)
follows from Transmute with Mi = proj(|i〉), G := e, G
′ := u, and simplification.
We proceed to the actual proof of Measure*. We calculate:{
A
}
Y ←measure X
{
Ucopy,X→e′ · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}
}
(rule Measure)
⇛
{∨
i(proj(|i〉)onX) · Ucopy,X→u · Ucopy,X→Y · A{e/Y}
}
(rule Transmute with Mi := proj(|i〉), G := e
′, G′ := u)
(∗)
=
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉, u =q |i〉
)}
(∗∗)
=
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, X =q |i〉, Y =q |i〉, u =q |i〉
)}
⊆
{∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉, X ≡cl u, X ≡cl Y
)}
⊆
{
X ≡cl u, X ≡cl Y,
∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉
)}
=
{
class(X), X ≡cl Y,
∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉
)}
(4)
⇛
{
class(X), class(Y),
∨
i
(
(proj(|i〉)onX) · A{e/Y}, Y =q |i〉
)}
Here (∗) follows since (proj(|i〉)onu)Ucopy,X→uUcopy,X→Yφ = (proj(|i〉)onX)φ⊗ |i〉u ⊗ |i〉Y for
all φ. And (∗∗) follows since (proj(|i〉)onX) · A ⊆ (X =q |i〉). Then Measure* follows using
Conseq and Seq. 
Sampling. Finally, we consider sampling X
$
← D. Again, we have a rule Sample that remem-
bers the distribution D, and a rule Sample* that only remembers which values can occur.
Sample{
A
}
X
$
← D
{
A{e/X}, distrib(X, D)
}
Sample*{
A
}
X
$
← D
{
A{e/X}, class(X),
∨
i∈suppDX =q |i〉
}
Here suppD is the support of the distribution D, i.e., suppD = {i : D(i) 6= 0}. That is, the
postcondition from Sample says that X is distributed according to D (distrib(X, D)), while
the postcondition from rule Sample* merely says that X is classical and has value i (X =q |i〉)
for some i ∈ suppD. Both rules can be derived easily using the definition of distrib(X, D) as
syntactic sugar and the rules we have derived above:
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Proof of Sample. Recall that X
$
← D is syntactic sugar for “X
q
← ψD;measure X” where
ψD =
∑
i∈T
√
D(i)|i〉. And distrib(X, D) is syntactic sugar for Xe =q ψDD where ψDD =∑
i
√
D(i)|i, i〉 and e is fresh. We have (with fresh e, e′):{
A
}
X
q
← ψD
{
A{e/X}, X =q ψD
}
(rule InitQ)
measure X
{
Ucopy,X→e′ · (A{e/X}, X =q ψD)
}
(rule MeasureForget)
=
{
A{e/X}, Ucopy,X→e′ · (X =q ψD)
}
=
{
A{e/X}, Xe =q ψDD
}
=
{
A{e/X}, distrib(X, D)
}
.
Rule Sample then follows by rule Seq. 
Proof of Sample*. Recall that X
$
← D is syntactic sugar for “X
q
← ψD;measure X” where
ψD =
∑
i∈T
√
D(i)|i〉. We have (with fresh e):{
A
}
X
q
← ψD
{
A{e/X}, X =q ψD
}
(rule InitQ)
measure X
{
class(X),
∨
i(proj(|i〉)onX) · (A{e/X}, X =q ψD)
}
(rule MeasureForget*)
=
{
class(X),
∨
i
(
A{e/X}, X =q proj(|i〉)ψD
)}
⊆
{
A{e/X}, class(X),
∨
iX =q proj(|i〉)ψD
}
(∗)
=
{
A{e/X}, class(X),
∨
i∈suppDX =q |i〉
}
.
Here (∗) follows since proj(|i〉)ψD = 0 for i /∈ suppD, and 0 6= proj(|i〉)ψD ∝ |i〉 for i ∈ suppD.
Rule Sample* then follows by rules Seq and Conseq. 
Final note. Without the concept of ghosts, we would not have been able to express rule Init
and thus not have been able to derive the above rules. Instead, we would have had to directly
prove rules for measurements and sampling directly from the semantics. And without ghosts,
those rules would not have been as expressive, for example, Sample would not have been ex-
pressible (i.e., we cannot express what distribution X has after sampling), and rule Sample*
would lack the predicate class(X), i.e., we cannot express that X is not a superposition between
different |i〉 with i ∈ suppD.
7.2 Programs with classical variables
In this section, we show how programs using classical variables can be conveniently treated in
our logic, even though the definition of our programming language does not contain classical
variables. The lack of classical variables in language and logic has, at the first glance, a number
of negative consequences:
(i) Any classical values in a program need to be encoded as quantum states. In particular,
reasoning steps that hold only for classical variables cannot be applied. (E.g., a case
distinction over the value of the classical variable.)
(ii) Quantum operations cannot be parametrized by classical values. For example, we might
wish to model a program step such as apply Uy to x, i.e., Ui is a family of isometries, and
the classical variable y selects which of them is applied to x. For example, in [19], every
program step can be parametrized by all classical variables, and this possibility is essential
for expressing more complicated programs (e.g., the cryptographic schemes analyzed there).
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(iii) Predicates cannot depend on classical values. For example, we might wish to say something
like x ∈q Sy, i.e., Si is a family of subspaces, and x lies in the subspaces Sy selected by
the classical variable y. For example, [19] handles this by defining predicates to be families
of subspaces indexed by the values of the classical variables (and not simply subspaces as
is the case here). Such predicates are necessary for more complex analyses, e.g., think of
Grover’s algorithm [10] where the loop invariant would have to state that the quantum
register is in a state that depends on how many iterations have been performed so far (the
iteration counter being a classical variable).
As we see, a special treatment of classical variables is almost essential for convenient reasoning
about hybrid programs (i.e., programs that contain both classical and quantum values), yet such
a special treatment comes with a large formal overhead (the semantics are more complex, all
proofs need to distinguish between classical and quantum variables). In this section, we will
see how ghost variables allow us to recover the benefits of classical variables without the formal
overhead, simply by introducing additional syntactic sugar and some derived rules.
Syntactic sugar for programs. In our language, apply U to X requires U to be a constant.
Since X
q
← ψ, X ← z, and X
$
← D are all syntactic sugar based on apply, they inherit this
restriction, i.e., ψ, z,D are constants as well. Thus we cannot even write something as simple
as x ← y, meaning we assign the content of the classical variable y to x. We introduce some
syntactic sugar for apply that solves this problem:
Consider the term apply U to X where U is an expression containing program variables
Y of type T (disjoint from X). For any assignment z to the variables Y, U{z/Y} defines
an isometry U [z] (U evaluated for Y := z). Let U [Y] be the isometry on YX defined by
U [Y](|i〉Y ⊗ ψ) := |i〉Y ⊗ Uiψ. (That is U
[Y] is a controlled operation, like CNOT.) Finally,
apply U to X is syntactic sugar for apply U [Y] to YX.
This notation is best understood by looking at a typical example. Consider
apply e−2iπyH to x where H is some fixed Hermitian operator, and y has type R. Since
U := e−2πiyH contains the variable y, it defines the family U [z] := e−2πizH of unitaries. Then
U [y](|z〉Y ⊗ ψ) = |z〉Y ⊗ e
−2πizHψ. Then apply e−2iπyH to x = apply U [y] to yx applies
U [z] := e−2πizH to x if y is in state |z〉, as expected.
Note that this notation does not require that Y refers to classical variables. It is meaningful
to use this notation when Y does not contain classical data. However, in the remainder of this
paper, we will only use this notation when we think of Y as classical variables.
Since X
q
← ψ, X ← z, and X
$
← D are all syntactic sugar based on apply, this no-
tation automatically carries over to those constructs, too. For example, x
q
← y is syn-
tactic sugar for init x; apply U|y〉 to x with U|z〉|0〉 := |z〉 which is syntactic sugar for
init x; apply (U|y〉)
[y]
to yx where (U|y〉)
[y]
|z〉|0〉 = |z〉|z〉. Hence x
q
← y will initialize y
with |z〉 when x contains |z〉, as expected. Similarly, had we chosen to define a more complicated
measurement command in Section 3 (instead of Y ←measure X) that takes the measurement
basis as an additional argument, then that measurement command would generalize analogously
and allow us specify a basis that depends on classical variables.
Syntactic sugar for predicates. We use similar syntactic sugar for writing predicates that
depend on classical variables. Without such syntactic sugar, predicates such as x =q ψ can only
contain a constant ψ, i.e., ψ cannot depend on classical variables. An expression A containing
some (supposedly classical) variables Y of type T defines a family A[z] (z ∈ T ) of predicates
with fv(A[z]) ∩Y = ∅, resulting from substituting Y by z in the expression A. We then define
the predicate A[Y] :=
∨
z
(
Y =q |z〉, A
[z]
)
. (That is, |z〉Y ⊗ ψ ∈ A
[Y] iff ψ ∈ A[z].) We can now
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use the notation A[Y] in pre-/postconditions to parametrize predicates by the values of classical
variables. In most cases, we omit the [Y], writing simply the predicate A. While this notation is
potentially ambiguous, in most cases it will be clear where the [Y] has to be added since otherwise
the pre-/postconditions will not be welltyped.
We illustrate this by example: Consider the judgment{
class(y), x =q |0〉
}
apply e−2iπyH to x
{
class(y), x =q e
−2iπyH |0〉
}
. We have seen in
the previous paragraph how to read apply e−2iπyH to x. The precondition does not contain
any syntactic sugar related to classical variables. We now translate the postcondition. With-
out omission of the implicitly understood [y], it reads class(y), (x =q e
−2iπyH |0〉)[y]. (The
[y] cannot be placed elsewhere since including the class(y) in it would be mean that our
postcondition contain non-welltyped subterms terms class(z) for real z. And we cannot have
[xy] instead of [y] since that would lead to non-welltyped subterms z1 =q . . . where z1 is not
a variable.) Then x =q e
−2iπyH |0〉 defines a family of predicates x =q e−2iπzH |0〉 for real z,
and (x =q e
−2iπyH |0〉)[y] means
∨
z
(
y =q |z〉, x =q e
−2iπzH |0〉
)
. Thus the postcondition would,
without the syntactic sugar, read class(y),
∨
z
(
y =q |z〉, x =q e
−2iπzH |0〉
)
. Of course, given
appropriate rules such as ApplyParam below, one rarely needs to actually explicitly unfold the
syntactic sugar.
Derived rules. Since the syntactic sugar introduced in this section expands to language con-
structs for which we already have introduced rules, we could, in principle, reason about programs
involving classical variables with only the rules above. However, in practice this may be cumber-
some. Therefore we will now introduce a few derived rules specifically for the dealing with such
programs. The first is a simple consequence of rule Case:
CaseClassical
∀z. {Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A
[z]} c {B}
{class(Y),A[Y]} c {B}
Proof. Let T be the type of Y. For any z ∈ T , we have (Y =q |z〉, A
[z]) =
(Y =q |z〉,
∨
z′(Y =q |z
′〉, A[z
′])) = (Y =q |z〉, A
[Y]). (The first equality follows since
(Y =q |z〉, Y =q |z
′〉, A[z
′]) = 0 for z 6= z′.) Thus the premise of CaseClassical becomes
∀z. {Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A
[Y]} c {B}. By Case (with A := (class(Y), A[Y]), C := class(X),
M := {|z〉}z∈T ), we get {class(Y), A[Y]} c {B}. (Using Lemma 6 to show class(X) is {|z〉}z∈T -
disentangling.) 
From this rule, we can derive a rule for our classically parametrized apply-command:
ApplyParam
fv(e) ⊆ Y Y ∩X = ∅{
class(Y), A[Y]
}
apply e to X
{
class(Y),
(
(e onX) · A
)[Y]}
Note that his rule is basically the same as rule Apply (especially if we write it with omitted [Y]),
except that we allow expression e that specifies the operation to apply to contain variables Y
that must be guaranteed to be classical in the precondition (class(Y)).
Proof. Let Y′ := fv(e). Let Y′′ := Y \Y′. Let T, T ′, T ′′ be the types of Y,Y′,Y′′, respectively.
Then T = T ′ × T ′′ (up to a canonical bijection). Then apply e to X is syntactic sugar for
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apply e[Y
′] to Y′X where e[z
′] := e{z′/Y′} for z′ ∈ T ′. For any z = (z′, z′′) ∈ T , we have:{
Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A
[z]
}
apply e[Y
′] to Y′X
{
(e[Y
′] onY′X) · (Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A[z])
}
(∗)
=
{
(e[z
′] onX) · (Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A
[z])
}
=
{
Y =q |z〉, class(Y), (e
[z′] onX) · A[z]
}
=
{
Y =q |z〉, class(Y), ((e onX) · A)
[z]}
(∗∗)
=
{
Y =q |z〉, class(Y),
∨
z˜
(
Y =q |z˜〉, ((e onX) · A)
[z])}
=
{
Y =q |z〉, class(Y), ((e onX) · A)
[Y]}.
⊆
{
class(Y), ((e onX) · A)
[Y]}
.
Here (∗) follows from the fact that by definition, U [Y
′] operates as U [z] on quantum memories
in Y =q |z〉. And (∗∗) follows since (Y =q |z〉,Y =q |z˜〉,A
[z˜]) = 0 for z 6= z˜.
Thus (using rule Conseq and the syntactic sugar for apply):
{Y =q |z〉, class(Y), A
[z]} apply e to X {class(Y), ((e onX) · A)[Y]}
By rule CaseClassical (with B :=
(
class(Y), ((e onX) · A)
[Y])
), we get the conclusion of
rule ApplyParam. 
For a simple example of using this rule see the correctness of the quantum one-time pad
(Section 8.1).
8 Case Study: Quantum One-time Pad
In this section, we give a more advanced example of using Hoare logic with ghosts. We analyze
the quantum one-time pad (QOTP, [3, 16]), a simple encryption scheme for quantum data. First,
we analyze its correctness (i.e., the fact that decryption correctly yields the original plaintext).
This is entirely unproblematic and can be done in most variants of quantum Hoare logic. We
include this case as a warm-up example for reasoning with mixed quantum and classical data.
Then we turn to the security of the QOTP, i.e., the fact that an encrypted qubit looks like
random data if the key is not known. For reasons described below (Section 8.2), this is hard
or impossible with prior variants of quantum Hoare logic. It thus shows nicely the power of
ghosts.
The QOTP, presented here in its version for single qubits, is very simple: The key x = (x1, x2)
are two uniformly random classical bits. The plaintext y is a qubit. To encrypt, we apply the
Pauli-Z operator Z :=
(
1 0
0 −1
)
iff x1 = 1. Then we apply the Pauli-X operator X :=
(
0 1
1 0
)
iff
x2 = 1. Or, written more compactly, to encrypt y, we apply X
x2Zx1 to it.
Decryption works by inverting the sequence of operations, i.e., by applying Zx1Xx2 to y.
In our language, the QOTP, consisting of key generation, encryption, and decryption, is
expressed as follows:
Keygen := x
$
← K, Enc := apply Xx2Zx1 to y Dec := apply Zx1Xx2 to y
Here x has type K := {0, 1}2 (the key space), y has type M := {0, 1} (the message space).
In slight abuse of notation, we also use K and M for the uniform distributions over K and
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M , respectively. Note that the definitions of Enc,Dec make use of the syntactic sugar from
Section 7.2.
8.1 Correctness of the QOTP
The correctness of the QOTP can be expressed by the following Hoare judgment:
∀z, ψ.
{
yz =q ψ
}
Keygen;Enc;Dec
{
yz =q ψ
}
(5)
We introduced an extra variable z here to model that even if y is entangled with some other
system z, decryption correct restores the state of y and its entanglement with z.19 Using the
rules from this paper, the derivation of (5) is elementary:{
yz =q ψ
}
x
$
← K
{
yz =q ψ, class(x),
∨
i x =q |i〉
}
(rule Sample*)
⊆
{
class(x), yz =q ψ
}
apply Xx2Zx1 to y
{
class(x), (Xx2Zx1 ony) · (yz =q ψ)
}
(rule ApplyParam)
apply Zx1Xx2 to y
{
class(x), (Zx1Xx2 ony) · (Xx2Zx1 ony) · (yz =q ψ)
}
(rule ApplyParam)
=
{
class(x), (Zx1Xx2Xx2Zx1 ony) · (yz =q ψ)
}
(∗)
=
{
class(x), (idony) · (yz =q ψ)
}
=
{
class(x), yz =q ψ
}
Here (∗) uses that ZZ = XX = id. By rules Seq and Conseq, and the definitions of
Keygen,Enc,Dec, we then get (5).
8.2 The Quantum One-time Pad and Other Logics
In this section, we explain why it is hard or even impossible to analyze the security of the QOTP
in existing quantum Hoare logics (without ghosts). This section is not required for understanding
the security proof and can be skipped. However, it illustrates why we need ghosts. Since this
section is about logics from prior work, and it would be beyond the scope of this section to
introduce those logics in more detail, in this section we assume some familiarity with the logics
referenced here.
Security of the QOTP means that, after encrypting, the variable y is indistinguishable from
a uniformly random bit. (More precisely, after running Keygen;Enc.) How can we model/prove
this in different Hoare logics?
Quantum Hoare logic with subspace predicates. Probably the simplest and most obvious
variant of quantum Hoare logic is quantum Hoare logic with subspaces. Here pre-/postconditions
are modeled as subspaces (a.k.a. sharp predicates, Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic). See
the “Recap Hoare logic” paragraph on page 9 for additional details. In this logic, we cannot
express that y is uniformly distributed. Specifically, any predicate A on y that holds when y is a
uniformly distributed bit has to also hold for any other distribution! Namely, since y can be |0〉
or |1〉 (or anything else), A needs to contain |0〉 and |1〉. But the only subspace containing both
|0〉 and |1〉 is the full space ℓ2[y] = ⊤. Thus, the only postcondition on y that would be satisfied
by the QOTP encryption is ⊤ which would also be satisfied by any insecure encryption scheme.
So we cannot formulate (let alone prove) any judgment in this variant of quantum Hoare logic
that would express the security of the QOTP.
19A more elementary statement would be ∀ψ. {y =q ψ}Keygen;Enc;Dec {y =q ψ}. Alternatively, we could
also state a stronger statement “{A}Keygen;Enc;Dec {A} for all A with x /∈ fv(A).” Both can be proven with
essentially the same derivation as (5).
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Quantum Hoare logic with expectations. A more expressive variant of quantum Hoare
logic is Hoare logic with expectations. Here, predicates are quantitative “expectations”,20 that
is, for a given state ρ, satisfaction of a predicate A is not binary (true/false), but a predicate ρ is
satisfied to a certain degree. (Formally, A is a Hermitian operator and the degree of satisfaction
is defined as trAρ.) And a Hoare judgment {A} c {B} means that JcK(ρ) satisfies B at least as
much as ρ satisfies A. Such a logic can be expressed in two ways, either via Hoare triples (e.g.,
[20]) or equivalently in terms of weakest preconditions [7].
We know that the weakest preconditions of a quantum program determines the denotational
semantics of said program [7], that is, if c and d have the same weakest preconditions, then JcK =
JdK. (Where J·K is defined as in Section 3.) Or equivalently: JcK = JdK iff for all predicates A,B,
{A} c {B} ⇔ {A}d {B}. (This holds only if the predicates A,B are expectations!) Thus we could
define security of the QOTP by requiring that Keygen;Enc has the same weakest preconditions
as the program y
$
← M . (Where we do not allow predicates to refer to x since security only
holds when the key is secret. For simplicity, we will assume that y is the only variable left
after execution.) The weakest precondition for y
$
← M and postcondition B is 12 trB · id. Thus
we can define security of the QOTP as follows: The QOTP is secure iff for all B, the weakest
precondition of Keygen;Enc for postcondition B is 12 trB · id. Or in terms of Hoare judgments:
The QOTP is secure iff for all A,B with A ≤ 12 trB · id, we have {A}Keygen;Enc {B} and for all
A,B with A  12 trB · id, we do not have {A}Keygen;Enc {B}.
This is formally correct (except for the fact that we glossed over the fact that there are
variables beyond y), and security of the one-time pad can be derived due to the completeness of
the calculus from [7]. However, the definition is very awkward. In order to prove the security of
the one-time pad, not only do we need to prove that {A}Keygen;Enc {B} holds for certain A,B
but also that is does not hold for certain others. This is problematic since usually we reason only
in terms of judgments that hold, and not in terms of judgments that do not hold. (Or, in terms
of weakest precondition, we reason about inequalities, not equalities.) Especially in the presence
of partial specifications, proving that certain judgments do not hold might be very difficult.
What happens if we simply omit the requirement that some judgments do not hold? I.e., we
use the following definition: The QOTP is secure iff for all A,B with A ≤ 12 trB · id, we have
{A}Keygen;Enc {B}. As it turns out, this works for the QOTP (we can show that this condition
is equivalent to the original one). However, this is accidental, and for slight variations of the
QOTP, this might not work any more.
To illustrate this, consider the following slightly artificial variant 12QOTP of the QOTP: This
variant has an encryption algorithm Enc1/2 that terminates only with probability
1
2 , but that
works correctly when it terminates. That is Enc1/2 := T ;Enc where T is a program that does
not touch any variables and terminates with probability 12 (i.e., JT K(ρ) =
1
2ρ, e.g., implemented
as a loop). Analogous to the above, we can say that the 12QOTP is secure iff for all A,B with
A ≤ 14 trB · id, we have {A}Keygen;Enc1/2 {B}. (Note that
1
2 was replaced by
1
4 , since we now
compare with the program T ;y
$
←M which only satisfies these judgments.) But now consider a
program c that with probability 12 runs skip, and with probability
1
2 runs the original QOTP.
21
This is clearly not a secure encryption scheme (with probability 12 the plaintext is leaked by the
program skip). Yet, we can check that when A ≤ 14 trB · id, we have {A} c {B}. Hence the
insecure c also satisfies our definition of security! Thus, our security definition of the 12QOTP
does not guarantee any reasonable security.
Summarizing, if we want to analyze the security of the QOTP or variants in quantum Hoare
logic with expectations, it can be done in principle, but we need complicated definitions (we
20Analogous to the classical expectations by Kozen [14].
21Formally, c := z
$
←M ; if z then Keygen;Enc else skip.
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cannot express the security as a single judgment but through an infinite family). And we need
to not only prove that judgments hold but also that some judgments do not hold. (Except in
some cases like the QOTP proper where positive judgments are sufficient. But seeing this needs
additional extra-logical reasoning and does not generalize, e.g., to the 12QOTP.) And even if we
surmount these difficulties, it is not clear how we can reason with such families of judgments in
a larger context (e.g., if the security of the QOTP is needed to derive some property of a larger
program).
Quantum relational Hoare logic. Another variant of Hoare logic that seems particularly
suitable for the analysis of the QOTP is quantum relational Hoare logic (qRHL [19]). This
logic was specifically designed with cryptographic proofs in mind, inspired by the success of
probabilistic relational Hoare logic [2]. In qRHL, Hoare judgments apply to pairs of programs.
Very roughly speaking, a judgment such as {A} c ∼ d {B} means that, if the memories of c and d
jointly satisfy the predicate A before the execution of c and d, they will jointly satisfy B afterwards.
For example, ifX1,X2 are the variables of c, d, respectively, then {X1 ≡q X2} c ∼ d {X1 ≡q X2}
means that for identical initial states, c,d have identical final states. In other words, JcK = JdK.
And {⊤} c ∼ d {X1 ≡q X2} would mean that the final states are identical, no matter what the
initial states are, i.e., ∀ρ, ρ′. JcK(ρ) = JdK(ρ′).
Thus, at the first glance, it seems very easy to model the security of the one-time pad. To
specify that y is uniformly random after execution of the QOTP (no matter what its initial
state was), we simply require that y after the QOTP is the same as y after y
$
← M . That is,
we say the QOTP is secure iff {⊤}Keygen;Enc ∼ y
$
←M {y1 ≡q y2}.
22 (Here y1,y2 refer to
the y from the left/right program, respectively.) Unfortunately, this does not work. We can
show that {⊤}Keygen;Enc ∼ y
$
←M {y1 ≡q y2} does not hold in qRHL. Intuitively, the reason
is that after encrypting, y1 is still correlated with the key x1. This means that it could still
be decrypted to the original plaintext, and therefore qRHL does not consider it equivalent to a
uniformly random y2 (that is independent of any other variables).
To resolve this, we need to erase the key after encrypting. So the definition becomes: The
QOTP is secure iff
{⊤}Keygen;Enc;x← 00 ∼ y
$
←M {y1 ≡q y2}. (6)
This judgment is indeed a good definition for the security of the QOTP. It is not hard to prove
that it holds by explicitly computing the superoperators JKeygen;Enc;x← 00K and Jy
$
←MK,
and then showing (6) directly from the semantic definition of qRHL. In that sense, qRHL is
superior to the two Hoare logic variants above: at least we can state the security of the QOTP
concisely. (And for variants of it such as 12QOTP, similar definitions work.)
Unfortunately, it seems hard (or impossible) to derive (6) within the logic. (That is, by an
application of a sequence of reasoning rules.) While we do not have a proof that (6) cannot be de-
rived from the rules from [19], a natural proof would seem to go along the following lines: First, we
show {⊤}Keygen;Enc ∼ y
$
←M {B} for some B, then we show {B}x← 00 ∼ skip {y1 ≡q y2},
and then we use the qRHL-analogue to rule Seq to conclude (6). Unfortunately, we can
show that there exists no predicate B such that both {⊤}Keygen;Enc ∼ y
$
←M {B} and
{B}x← 00 ∼ skip {y1 ≡q y2} are true. Hence this proof approach is doomed.
To summarize, in qRHL, while it is easy to formulate the security of the QOTP, there are
reasons to believe that the security proof is difficult or even impossible.
22Or alternatively, we could define security as {⊤}Keygen;Enc ∼ Keygen;Enc {y1 ≡q y2} which means that
the ciphertexts y1,y2 have the same distribution, no matter what the plaintexts (initial values of y1,y2) are.
The difficulties described here apply in the same way to that definition.
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8.3 Security of the Quantum One-time Pad
We will now demonstrate how to prove the security of the QOTP using quantum Hoare logic with
ghosts. Security of the QOTP means that, after encrypting, the variable y is indistinguishable
from a uniformly random bit, as long as the key is not known. We formalize this by requiring
that after key generation, encryption, and subsequent deletion of the key, y is uniformly random.
As a Hoare judgment, we write this as:{
⊤
}
Keygen;Enc;x← 00
{
uniform(y)
}
. (7)
The x← 00 overwrites the key x and is added to model the fact that we do not know the key.23
The precondition is ⊤ since we do not want to make any assumption about the initial state of y,
i.e., about the plaintext. (In particular, the plaintext can be entangled with other variables.)
Warm up. Before we show (7), we prove a weaker claim as a warm up:
∀ψ 6= 0.
{
y =q ψ
}
Keygen;Enc;x← 00
{
uniform(y)
}
. (8)
This equation say that the QOTP is secure as long as the plaintext y is some (arbitraty) state ψ.
That is, it only guarantees security for unentangled plaintexts. We will do the general case (7)
below, but the simplified case is simpler and contains already many of the needed ideas.
Recall that Keygen = x
$
← K and Enc = apply Xx2Zx1 to y. We first derive a
postcondition for Keygen;Enc;x← 00 by simply applying the reasoning rules step by step:{
y =q ψ
}
x
$
← K
{
y =q ψ, uniform(x)
}
(rule Sample)
apply Xx2Zx1 to y
{(
(Xx2Zx1)
[x]
onxy
)
·
(
y =q ψ, uniform(x)
)}
(rule Apply)
x← 00
{(
(Xe2Ze1)
[e]
oney
)
·
(
y =q ψ, uniform(e)
)
, x =q |00〉, class(x)
}
(rule InitC)
⊆
{(
(Xe2Ze1)
[e]
oney
)
·
(
y =q ψ, uniform(e)
)}
For the application of rule Sample, recall that uniform(x) is syntactic sugar for distrib(x,K)
where K is the uniform distribution on the type of x. For the application of rule Apply, recall
that apply Xx2Zx1 to y is syntactic sugar for apply (Xx2Zx1)
[x]
to xy (page 33). By rules
Seq and Conseq, we immediately get{
y =q ψ
}
Keygen;Enc;x← 00
{(
(Xe2Ze1)
[e]
oney
)
·
(
y =q ψ, uniform(e)
)}
=: {B}. (9)
While this is not yet the final result (8) we wanted, we see that the application of the InitC
rule already achieved one important thing: Since x was turned into a ghost, the postcondition B
refers only to the ciphertext y and not other variables, i.e., we got rid of the dependence between
y and x. What is left to do is to prove that the postcondition B implies uniform(y).
Analyzing B involves some calculations. (This is to be expected because the QOTP re-
lies on the properties of the involved matrices, so we have to calculate somewhere.) We
first unfold the syntactic sugar. uniform(e) means ee′ =q ψKK for some fresh e′. Thus
23One might think that it should be sufficient to simply not mention the key in the postcondition. I.e., to
define security as
{
⊤
}
Keygen;Enc
{
uniform(y)
}
. However, from Lemma 2 we know that in a state satisfying
uniform(y), y is uniform and independent of all other variables. This is clearly not the case after encryption
(y is not independent of the key x). Thus
{
⊤
}
Keygen;Enc
{
uniform(y)
}
does not hold.
39
(y =q ψ, uniform(e)) = (yee
′ =q ψ ⊗ ψKK). Furthermore (Xe2Ze1)
[e]
=
∑
k∈K proj(|k〉) ⊗
Xk2Zk1 (see page 33). Thus
B =
((∑
k∈K
proj(|k〉)⊗Xk2Zk1
)
oney
)
·
(
yee′ =q ψ ⊗ ψKK
)
(∗)
=
(
yee′ =q
(∑
k
Xk2Zk1 ⊗ proj(|k〉)⊗ id
)
(ψ ⊗ ψKK)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:φ
)
.
(Note that in (∗), the tensor product factors in the sum are written in a different order because
the (. . . oney)-term and the (yee′ =q . . . )-term list the variables in a different order.) Since
B is now of the form yee′ = φ, it is amenable to rewriting using rule ShapeShift. Further-
more, our intended postcondition uniform(y) is syntactic sugar for ye′′ =q ψMM , which is also
compatible with ShapeShift. Specifically, if we can show tree′ proj(φ) = tre′′ proj(ψMM ), then
rule ShapeShift implies
B = (yee′ =q φ)⇛ (ye =q ψMM ) = uniform(y). (10)
(Recall that M is the uniform distribution on the type of y, i.e., on {0, 1}.) We now show
tree′ proj(φ) = tre′′ proj(ψMM ) by computation. Since ψKK =
∑
l∈K
1
2 |l〉 ⊗ |l〉 by definition, we
have:
φ =
∑
kl
1
2X
k2Zk1ψ ⊗ proj(|k〉) |l〉e ⊗ |l〉e′ =
∑
k
1
2X
k2Zk1ψ ⊗ |k〉e ⊗ |k〉e′ .
Thus
tree′ proj(φ) = tree′
∑
kk′
1
4X
k2Zk1proj(ψ)(Xk
′
2Zk
′
1)∗ ⊗ |k〉〈k′|e ⊗ |k〉〈k′|e′
(∗)
=
∑
k
1
4 X
k2Zk1proj(ψ)(Xk2Zk1)∗ =
∑
k
1
4 proj(X
k2Zk1ψ).
Here (∗) follows from the facts that tree′ σ ⊗ τ = σ tr τ and that tr|k〉〈k
′| = 1 if k = k′ and
= 0 otherwise. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ‖ψ‖ = 1 (because the predicate
y =q ψ does not change if we multiply ψ with a nonzero scalar.) Thus ψ =
(
α
β
)
for some α, β ∈ C
with αα∗ + ββ∗ = 1. Then
∑
k
1
4 proj(X
k2Zk1ψ) can be explicitly computed (a sum of four
2 × 2-matrices), and simplifies to 12 id. Furthermore, we easily compute that tre′′ ψMM =
1
2 id.
Thus tree′ proj(φ) = tre′′ proj(ψMM ). Hence (10) follows by rule ShapeShift. From (9), (10),
with rule Seq, we get (8). This shows the security of the QOTP in the special case that the
plaintext is unentangled.
General case. We have shown the security of the QOTP in the special case (8) that the
plaintext is not entangled with anything else but is in a fixed but arbitrary state ψ. We now
show the general case (7). To do so, we first show something similar to the special case (8),
namely that the QOTP is secure when the plaintext y and one further variable z are in a fixed
state ψ. (And, for technical reasons we also include the variable x, but that variable is less
interesting since it is overwritten by Keygen.) Formally,
∀ψ 6= 0.
{
yzx =q ψ
}
Keygen;Enc;x← 00
{
uniform(y)
}
. (11)
Here z is a program variable of infinite cardinality (e.g., of type integer). Intuitively, this already
means that the QOTP is secure when the plaintext y is entangled. And indeed, the general
40
case (7) then is an immediate consequence of (11) and rule Universe (with X := xy, x := z,
E := U := ∅, A := ⊤, B := uniform(y)).
We are left to show (11). This is done similarly to (8), except that the computations are a
bit more complex. First, we have{
yzx =q ψ
}
x
$
← K
{
yze′′ =q ψ, uniform(x)
}
(rule Sample)
apply Xx2Zx1 to y
{(
(Xx2Zx1)
[x]
onxy
)
·
(
yze′′ =q ψ, uniform(x)
)}
(rule Apply)
x← 00
{(
(Xe2Ze1)
[e]
oney
)
·
(
yze′′ =q ψ, uniform(e)
)
, x =q |00〉, class(x)
}
(rule InitC)
⊆
{(
(Xe2Ze1)
[e]
oney
)
·
(
yze′′ =q ψ, uniform(e)
)}
.
Thus with rule Seq and rule Conseq:{
yzx =q ψ
}
Keygen;Enc;x← 00
{(
(Xe2Ze1)[e] oney
)
·
(
yze′′ =q ψ, uniform(e)
)}
=: {B′}.
(12)
As in the special case, we unfold syntactic sugar and we get:
B′ =
(
yze′′ee′ =q
(∑
k∈K
Xk2Zk1 ⊗ idze′′ ⊗ proj(|k〉e)⊗ ide′
)
(ψ ⊗ ψKK)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:φ′
)
.
Quite analogous to the special case, we compute
φ′ =
∑
k
1
2 (X
k2Zk1 ⊗ idze′′ )ψ⊗|k〉e⊗|k〉e′ and tree′ proj(φ
′) =
∑
k
1
4proj
(
(Xk2Zk1 ⊗ idze′′ )ψ
)
.
(13)
(We will additionally need to trace out e′′, but the computation is easier if we do not do that
yet.) We can write ψ as |0〉y ⊗ ψ0 + |1〉y ⊗ ψ1 for some ψ0, ψ1 over ze
′′. By substituting this in
the rhs of the second equation in (13), and multiplying out and canceling terms, we get
tree′ proj(φ
′) = 12
(
proj(|0〉)y + proj(|1〉)y
)
⊗
(
proj(ψ0) + proj(ψ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρze′′
)
= 12 idy ⊗ ρze′′ .
Let ey, ez be additional entangled ghosts. Then trey proj(ψMM ) =
1
2 idy (if we interpret ψMM as a
quantum memory over yey). And there exists a γ over ze
′ez such that trez proj(γ) = ρze′′ . Thus
tree′ proj(φ
′) = treyez proj(ψMM ⊗ γ). Hence tre′′ee′ proj(φ
′) = tre′′eyez proj(ψMM ⊗ γ). Using
rule ShapeShift for (∗), we thus have
B′ = (yze′′ee′ =q φ′)
(∗)
⇛ (yeyze
′′ez =q ψMM ⊗ γ)
= (yey =q ψMM , ze
′′ez =q γ) ⊆ (yey =q ψMM ) = uniform(y).
Then (11) follows with (12), rule Seq and rule Conseq. And, as mentioned above, the general
case (7) is an immediate consequence of (11) and rule Universe. This shows the security of the
QOTP.
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Symbol index
suppM Support of an operator M 9
Z Pauli-Z operator 35
CNOT (Generalized) CNOT 5
skip Program: does nothing 7
↓i(ρ) Mixed state restricted to measurement outcome i 8
JcK Denotation of a program c 7
trV ρ Partial trace (removing variables V) 5
ψD State encoding the distribution D 8
ψDD State encoding the distribution D (on two variables) 12
distrib(X, D) Predicate: X has distribution D 12
uniform(X) Predicate: X has uniform distribution 12
X
q
← ψ Program: Initialize X with quantum state ψ 8
separable(X) Predicate: X is separable from all other variables 13
A{v/w} Predicate A with w substituted by v 6
A⇛ B “Implication” of predicates 19
M · A Operator M applied to subspace A 5
Enc Encryption algorithm of the QOTP 35
measure X Program: Measure X in computational basis, forget out-
come
8
X
$
← D Program: Sample X according to distribution D 8
progvars(V) Set of program variables in V 4
V ∈q S Predicate: V has a value in S 6
spanA Span, smallest subspace containing A
V =q ψ Predicate: V is in state ψ 6
W ≡q W
′ Predicate: W and W′ are in the same state 13
U onV Operator U applied to variables V 5
A,B,C (Quantum) predicates 5
‖ψ‖ Norm of vector ψ
|x| Absolute value/cardinality
trM Trace of matrix/operator M
id Identity
proj(ψ) Projector onto ψ, i.e., ψψ∗ 4
a∗ Adjoint of operator/vector a 4
V ≡cl V
′ Predicate: V and V′ are classically in the same state 15
SWAP Unitary that swaps W and W′ 13
while x do c Program: While (loop) 7
c;d Program: execute c then d 7
N Natural numbers 1, 2, 3, . . .
Dec Decryption algorithm of the QOTP 35
C Complex numbers
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R Real numbers
v,w Variable 4
x,y, z Program variable 4
u Unentangled ghost variable 4
e Entangled ghost variable 4
X,Y,Z List/set of program variables 4
g Ghost variable 4
X Pauli-X operator 35
y←measure X Program: Measure X in computational basis, assign out-
come to y
8
{A} c ∼ d {B} Relational Hoare judgment 38
if x then c else d Program: If (conditional) 7
class(X) Predicate: X is classical 15
A[X] Predicate Ai depending on X 33
U [X] Unitary Ui controlled by X 33
0 Default value (in every variable type) 4
rankM Rank of operator M
Ucopy,V→W Copies classically from V into W 28
UV→W Rename variables V into W 6
·∪ Disjoint union
imM Image of operator M
Keygen Key generation algorithm of the QOTP 35
ρ  A Mixed quantum memory ρ satisfies predicate A 10
E List/set of entangled ghost variables 4
U List/set of unentangled ghost variables 4
V,W List/set of variables 4
G List/set of ghost variables 4
〈x| Adjoint of |x〉, i.e., |x〉∗
|x〉 Basis state x 4
ℓ2[V] Pure quantum assignments on V 4
ℓ2(X) Hilbert space with basis indexed by X 4
A⊗B Tensor product of vectors/operators/spaces A and B
m An assignment 4
⊥ Predicate: never satisfied 5
⊤ Predicate: always satisfied 5
init x Program: Initialize x with |0〉 7
apply U to V Program: Apply U to variables V 7, 33
c,d A program 7
fv(a) Free variables of predicate/program a 6
A ∨ B Sum of predicates (disjunction) 5
{A} c {B} Hoare judgment 10
Xall Set of program variables that can be used in the execution
of a program
7
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A ∧ B, A,B Intersection of predicates (conjunction) 5
Enc1/2 Encryption algorithm of
1
2QOTP 37
suppD Support of a distribution D 31
X← z Program: Initialize X with classical value z 8
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Index
Apply (rule), 16
ApplyParam (rule), 34
assignment, 4
Case (rule), 18
CaseClassical (rule), 34
classical
in X, 14
classical equality, 15
Conseq (rule), 27
cq-state, 14
denotational semantics, 7
density operator, 4
disentangling, 17
equality
classical, 15
quantum, 13
expectation, 37
free variables, 6
ghost, short for ghost variable
ghost variable, 9
identify predicates, 6
If (rule), 17
Init (rule), 16
InitC (rule), 27
InitQ (rule), 27
key space
(of QOTP), 35
Measure (rule), 30
Measure* (rule), 30
MeasureForget (rule), 28
MeasureForget* (rule), 29
memory
(pure) quantum, 4
mixed (quantum), 5
message space
(of QOTP), 35
mixed (quantum) memory, 5
mixed state, 4
one-time pad
quantum, 35
operator
density, 4
partial trace, 5
Pauli-X, 35
Pauli-Z, 35
postcondition, 9
precondition, 9
predicate, 5
(identifying), 6
pure quantum memory, 4
QOTP, see quantum one-time pad
quantum equality, 13
quantum memory
(pure), 4
mixed, 5
quantum one-time pad, 35
Rename (rule), 19
Sample (rule), 31
Sample* (rule), 31
satisfy
a predicate, 10
semantics
denotational, 7
separable, 5
Seq (rule), 16
ShapeShift (rule), 19
Skip (rule), 16
state
mixed, 4
trace
partial, 5
Transmute (rule), 19
type
(of a list of variables), 4
(of a variable), 3
Universe (rule), 18
variable, 3
ghost, 9
variables
free, 6
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While (rule), 17
X
Pauli-, 35
Z
Pauli-, 35
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